Turkey After Iran? Strategic Calculations Beyond the Current War

Even before the outbreak of the ongoing war against Iran, discussions had been underway in certain Israeli and Western think tanks and decision-making circles that extended beyond the immediate objectives of the conflict with Tehran. These debates raised a broader question: how might the regional balance of power across the Middle East be reengineered?

Within this context, some arguments have emerged suggesting that Turkey could become the “next target” in the strategic calculations of both Israel and the United States—particularly if the war were to culminate in regime change in Iran and the dismantling of its regional influence.

For years, Israel has defined its primary strategic priority as countering what it describes as the Iranian threat. However, recent remarks by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—referring to a struggle against two axes, a Shiite axis led by Iran and a Sunni axis that includes Turkey and certain Arab states—indicate a widening of Israel’s strategic lens. They also hint at efforts to consolidate what some describe as a “third alliance” involving Israel, India, Greece, Cyprus, and other partners.

The underlying rationale is that under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara is no longer merely a regional state with periodic disagreements with Tel Aviv. Instead, it has evolved into a consequential actor competing with Israel across multiple strategic arenas: the Palestinian issue, influence in Syria and Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the defense industry and arms exports.

Should Iran cease to function as a balancing regional power, Turkey would stand as the only non-Arab state in the region combining a large economy, a strong conventional military, an advanced defense industry, and transnational political ambition. While this reality may generate concern in Tel Aviv, it does not necessarily translate into an automatic shift toward comprehensive confrontation.

According to serious strategic assessments, the prospect of direct military action against Turkey faces formidable obstacles. Turkey is a NATO member and fields the alliance’s second-largest army. A direct military confrontation between Israel and Turkey would likely plunge the region into unprecedented instability and place the United States in a complex legal and political dilemma within NATO.

Moreover, Turkey’s military capabilities—particularly in unmanned aerial systems and defense manufacturing—raise the potential costs of any clash. Ankara has demonstrated in theaters such as Syria and Libya its ability to deploy military technology effectively. Consequently, a direct war appears unlikely, except in the event of an uncontrolled escalation in overlapping arenas such as Syria or the Eastern Mediterranean.

Given these constraints, the more plausible scenario would involve efforts to induce internal political change within Turkey—whether by weakening the Justice and Development Party (AKP), re-empowering the military establishment, or facilitating the rise of political forces more closely aligned with Western and Israeli preferences. This line of thinking draws on Turkey’s history of military intervention in politics and the presence of a secular opposition critical of Erdoğan’s regional policies.

Other strategists caution, however, that expecting a fundamental shift in Turkey’s strategic orientation through a mere change of leadership may be overstated. From this perspective, economic leverage remains a more realistic instrument of pressure. Turkey faces inflationary pressures, fiscal imbalances, and currency volatility, and remains dependent on Western markets and foreign investment. The United States could, through sanctions or financial restrictions, exert significant pressure—similar to what occurred during the 2018 crisis surrounding the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson.

Yet this approach carries risks. Weakening Turkey’s economy could push Ankara closer to non-Western powers or encourage it to adopt more independent and adversarial policies. Furthermore, Turkey is an important trading partner for Europe; a severe economic downturn would have wide regional repercussions, including on migration flows.

In light of these considerations, Turkish–Israeli relations in the event of a fundamental transformation in Iran are more likely to evolve toward a pattern of sharp strategic competition rather than open war. Turkey is not an isolated actor but a regional power embedded in a complex web of regional and international alliances. Israel, despite its military superiority, recognizes that opening a new front against Ankara would entail significant political and military costs.

The coming period is therefore more likely to witness forms of slow-burning, multi-front rivalry—characterized by mutual pressure, repositioning, and attempts at containment. Washington may seek to discipline or constrain Turkish behavior, while Tel Aviv may focus, at least in the near term, on curbing Ankara’s influence in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean rather than risking direct confrontation.

Ultimately, Turkey’s trajectory in a post-Iran regional order will not be determined solely in Tel Aviv or Washington, but within Turkey itself: its capacity to achieve economic stability, manage internal diversity, address the Kurdish issue—which remains a strategic vulnerability—and craft a foreign policy that balances ambition with realism.

The notion that Turkey would become the “next target” in a direct military sense thus appears less as a scenario of swift war and more as one of prolonged pressure, containment, and strategic encirclement.

Such conclusions align with the logic and structural constraints of the regional and international strategic environment. Yet history reminds us that surprises often shape outcomes. For that reason, the possibility—however remote—of a future conflict involving Turkey cannot be entirely dismissed and should remain within the horizon of strategic planning for all concerned actors.