China’s Policy toward the U.S.–Israeli War on Iran: An Arab Perspective

Abstract

This paper argues that China’s position on the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran cannot be understood merely as a situational diplomatic response to a transient crisis. Rather, it should be viewed as an extension of a broader intellectual and strategic framework that Beijing has developed in recent years around the concepts of common security, international legitimacy, global governance, and development as a prerequisite for stability.

Since the first strikes on February 28, 2026, China has portrayed the war as an action undertaken without authorization from the United Nations, in violation of international law, and as a threat to Gulf security, energy security, maritime navigation, and regional stability. At the same time, however, this consistency in China’s legal and diplomatic discourse reveals the limitations of its role: while Beijing has emerged as a major power in economics, energy, and mediation, it has yet to become a security guarantor commensurate with the scale of its expanding interests.

The paper adopts an Arab perspective that goes beyond merely describing Beijing’s discourse. It seeks to explain the intellectual and strategic foundations of China’s position, analyze how that position is represented in both Chinese and non-Chinese scholarship, and assess its practical implications for the Gulf and the wider Arab world. It also examines the repercussions of the war on Chinese interests, China–Gulf relations, China–U.S. relations, and the opportunities and limitations of Chinese mediation.

Introduction

The U.S.–Israeli war on Iran erupted amid an exceptionally fragile international environment, rather than within a stable strategic setting conducive to rapid containment. The escalation came at a critical historical juncture for the international order established after the Second World War, which, after nearly eight decades of enduring successive crises and major challenges, now faces a profound turning point. The world is witnessing an unprecedented acceleration in the pace of transformations not seen in a century, amid an increasingly complex interplay of structural shifts, political and security disruptions, and recurring wars and conflicts.

In the weeks preceding the first strikes of the war, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had warned that the rule of international law was receding in the face of an increasingly dominant logic of power. Gaza remained under a fragile ceasefire and the closure of border crossings, while the war in Ukraine continued to drain Western resources and attention. At the same time, the World Trade Organization was calling for reform of the international trading system in response to growing protectionism and intensifying geo-economic frictions.

Against this backdrop, the war did not appear to be an isolated Middle Eastern crisis. Rather, it emerged as a manifestation of a broader global moment of instability in which normative constraints are weakening, crises are increasingly interconnected, and the likelihood is growing that a regional conflict could develop into a far-reaching international shock affecting energy security, the flow of global trade, and the legitimacy of the international order itself.¹

Examining China’s position on this war is particularly important for two interrelated reasons. First, China is no longer a marginal actor in the Gulf or West Asia. It has become a major power with deep energy, trade, and investment interests, as well as a coherent political discourse centered on security, development, and global governance. Second, the war has subjected this discourse to a direct practical test: Can Beijing translate its vision of common security and political settlement into an effective capacity to protect its interests, or at least into a meaningful role in ending or containing the war?

Accordingly, the central question of this paper is not confined to describing what China has said. It also seeks to explain why China adopted this position, how that position has been interpreted within China and abroad, and what it means for Arab states, particularly the Gulf countries.²

The paper proceeds from the central hypothesis that China’s position combines clear conceptual consistency with limited implementation capacity. Its approach is coherent in legal, political, and strategic terms because it rests on a set of Chinese concepts and initiatives developed over recent years. Yet it remains constrained by a gap between the expanding scope of China’s interests in the Gulf and Beijing’s limited willingness to bear direct security costs either to protect those interests or to impose a major regional settlement.

The Arab perspective adopted here is therefore twofold: it examines China’s position in itself while simultaneously assessing its limitations and implications for the Arab region.³

I. Analytical and Methodological Framework

This study adopts a methodological distinction among three interconnected levels: China’s official position, Chinese scholarly perspectives, and external assessments.

The official Chinese position is reflected in statements issued by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remarks by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the diplomatic activities of Special Envoy Zhai Jun, and China’s positions at the United Nations Security Council.

The Chinese scholarly perspective is reflected in the writings and interventions of Chinese researchers and analysts who expand upon the implications of official discourse, interpret the war within a broader geopolitical framework, or advance new analytical ideas.

The third level consists of Arab, Middle Eastern, and Western assessments by specialists in Chinese affairs, which seek to determine whether China should be understood in this war as a balanced actor, an actor with limited—or potentially broader—tools of influence, a power seeking to contain the crisis in the interests of regional and global peace and security, or a state attempting to turn the crisis into a source of relative strategic advantage without bearing its security costs.⁴

This distinction helps avoid two common analytical errors. The first is interpreting Chinese policy solely through official statements, as though what Beijing says publicly necessarily encompasses everything it thinks or everything it is capable of doing. The second is reducing China’s position to calculations of raw national interest, as though its discourse on sovereignty, legitimacy, and development were merely rhetorical cover.

A more accurate interpretation, in my view, is to understand China’s position as a synthesis of normative and interest-based dimensions. Beijing does possess a coherent conceptual and legal framework, but it simultaneously employs that framework within carefully calibrated calculations involving energy security, maritime corridors, relations with Washington, and China’s image as a responsible major power in the Global South.⁵*

The paper is guided by three principal analytical concepts.

The first is common security, or non-zero-sum security, a central concept within the Global Security Initiative. This concept holds that the security of one state should not be achieved at the expense of another and that the legitimate security concerns of all states must be taken seriously. This helps explain why China opposed the war against Iran while simultaneously rejecting its extension into the Gulf or any violation of the security of Iran’s Arab neighbors.

The second concept is international legitimacy. China’s position on the war is based to a significant extent on several fundamental questions: Who has the right to use force? Under what conditions may force legitimately be employed? And what role should the United Nations Security Council and the UN Charter play in regulating such actions?

The third concept, in my assessment, is strategic hedging. This concept is particularly useful for understanding the behavior of both China and the Gulf states, as both seek to broaden their networks of partnerships without abruptly committing themselves to rigid, unilateral alignments.⁶

In addition, this paper employs an Arab perspective as an evaluative framework, rather than merely as a geographical standpoint. In other words, the study asks not only: What is China’s position? It also asks: What is the actual value of this position for the Arab world and the Gulf?

This methodological choice is important because an Arab assessment does not view China merely as a competitor to the United States or as a partner of Iran. Rather, China is regarded as an active partner increasingly embedded in the Gulf’s security, energy, and development equations.

Consequently, the Arab criterion for evaluating China’s position is not limited to its theoretical consistency. It also concerns the extent to which that position corresponds with regional interests and China’s ability to contribute to de-escalating or containing the war, or preventing its expansion into the Arab sphere.⁷

The normative dimension of China’s position refers to the level grounded in declared legal and ethical principles governing international relations, including respect for state sovereignty, rejection of foreign intervention, opposition to externally imposed regime change by force, and adherence to the political settlement of disputes. The interest-based dimension, by contrast, refers to the strategic and economic calculations that shape China’s conduct in practice, particularly energy security, the safety of maritime routes, management of strategic competition with the United States, and preservation of China’s image as a responsible major power in the Global South. China’s position should therefore be understood neither as an expression of abstract principles alone nor as a mere reflection of material interests, but rather as a synthesis of normative legitimacy and strategic calculations.

II. The International and Regional Environment at the Outbreak of the War

The war did not erupt solely against the backdrop of U.S.–Iranian or Israeli–Iranian tensions. Rather, it broke out at a global moment characterized by the convergence of multiple wars and crises. Gaza remained under severe humanitarian and military pressure, while the war in Ukraine continued to consume Western resources and attention. At the same time, international organizations were warning of funding shortfalls and a declining capacity to uphold international norms.

From the outset, China therefore viewed the developments not merely as another military operation, but as part of a broader global trajectory in which reliance on international institutions is receding while the logic of unilateral force and hegemonic policies is expanding.⁸

This international environment was further complicated by the fact that the war erupted at the heart of the world’s most strategically important energy geography. The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passes, is not merely a regional maritime passage; it is a vital artery of global energy and international trade.

As the conflict expanded to affect energy infrastructure and maritime navigation, the global economy entered the circle of direct repercussions: oil and gas prices rose, stock markets experienced disruption, and the risks of inflation and stagflation increased.

This context is crucial to understanding China’s position. Beijing did not view the war solely through the lenses of sovereignty and international law, but also through the vulnerability of the energy and trade supply chains upon which its economic growth and domestic stability depend.⁹

Moreover, the war erupted at a time when China–U.S. relations were themselves undergoing a period of cautious détente following a trade truce in late 2025 and preliminary discussions in preparation for a Trump–Xi summit. The escalation of the war, however, disrupted this trajectory, imposed new military and political priorities on Washington, and brought the Gulf directly into the management of strategic competition between the world’s two largest powers.

China’s position on the war was therefore also shaped by concerns that the conflict could restructure the agenda of competition with Washington by linking Iran, Taiwan, trade, and energy into a single, interconnected package of strategic pressures.¹⁰

III. China’s Official Position on the U.S.–Israeli War on Iran

From the earliest days of the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran, China adopted a clear official position combining legal condemnation with a broader political interpretation of the crisis.

During Wang Yi’s telephone conversation with Sergey Lavrov in March 2026, the Chinese foreign minister described the attacks on Iran—while negotiations with Tehran were still underway—the public assassination of the leader of a sovereign state, and incitement toward regime change as unacceptable acts that violated international law and the basic norms governing international relations.

Wang Yi subsequently articulated China’s position more comprehensively during his press conference on March 8. He described the conflict as “a war that should never have happened” and stressed that “there are no winners in war.”

He argued that the proper approach to the Iranian issue and the wider Middle Eastern crisis required adherence to five interrelated principles: respect for state sovereignty; opposition to the arbitrary use of force; adherence to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs; political resolution of regional flashpoints through dialogue; and a constructive role for major powers based on fairness, impartiality, and good faith.

In this sense, China’s position was not merely a situational objection to a particular military strike. Rather, Beijing presented it as a defense of international legitimacy, regional stability, and the principle that regional security should not be reshaped through warfare or externally imposed regime change.¹¹

This discourse was not confined to broad normative principles. It was also accompanied by a practical identification of China’s priorities in managing the crisis.

On March 3, Mao Ning stated that the U.S.–Israeli strikes against Iran had not been authorized by the UN Security Council and violated international law. At the same time, however, she emphasized that the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the Gulf states must likewise be respected.

On March 11, Guo Jiakun further clarified that China “does not approve of attacks against Gulf countries and condemns indiscriminate attacks on civilians and non-military targets,” stressing that the immediate priority was to halt military operations and prevent the war from spreading.

This position demonstrates Beijing’s attempt to reconcile three interconnected considerations: opposition to the war against Iran on legal and political grounds; rejection of the war’s extension into neighboring Gulf states; and prevention of the conflict from degenerating into attacks against civilians and non-military infrastructure.

China’s position therefore did not appear as a simple or unconditional alignment with Iran. Rather, it reflected an attempt to contain the war and prevent it from escalating into a broader regional conflagration.¹²

As military operations expanded, Beijing moved from political statements toward more active diplomacy through the regional tour undertaken by the Chinese government’s Special Envoy on the Middle East Issue, Zhai Jun.

On March 19, Lin Jian stated that Zhai Jun had visited Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Egypt. He also met with the secretaries-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States and held a telephone conversation with the Qatari side.

During this tour, the Chinese envoy stressed that an immediate ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities represented the fundamental solution to the crisis. He also emphasized the need to respect the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the GCC states, refrain from targeting non-military facilities, and ensure the safety and uninterrupted operation of maritime routes.

The account of Zhai Jun’s meeting in Manama with Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani further demonstrated Beijing’s explicit opposition to attacks against Gulf states and their vital interests. Zhai stressed that non-military targets—including energy facilities, economic assets, and infrastructure affecting people’s livelihoods—must not be attacked, that maritime waterways must not be disrupted, and that China takes the legitimate security concerns of GCC countries seriously.¹³

The envoy’s tour therefore added an operational dimension to China’s position. Beijing was no longer merely condemning the war against Iran; it was also seeking to prevent the conflict from spilling over into the Gulf and to consolidate China’s image as a power committed to de-escalation and political containment in the region.

At the United Nations, China maintained the same position without substantial alteration.

In his explanation of China’s vote at the UN Security Council on March 11, Ambassador Fu Cong welcomed the Russian-sponsored draft resolution because it reaffirmed the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, called for an immediate cessation of military activities, condemned attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, and encouraged a return to diplomatic negotiations.

Fu Cong reiterated the phrase that had come to encapsulate China’s overall position: this was “a war that should not have happened” and one that “benefits no one.” He emphasized that the urgent priority was to halt military operations, prevent further escalation, and return to dialogue as quickly as possible.¹⁴

China’s official position can therefore be understood as resting on three interconnected pillars: first, condemning the unauthorized attack on Iran as a violation of sovereignty and international law; second, protecting Gulf security, civilians, infrastructure, and regional navigation from the consequences of an expanding war; and third, consistently advocating a ceasefire and a return to negotiations as the only acceptable path toward resolving the crisis.

IV. The Intellectual and Strategic Foundations of China’s Position

China’s position cannot be fully understood without reference to the Global Security Initiative (GSI).

The initiative’s Concept Paper, issued in February 2023, explicitly calls for eliminating the root causes of international conflicts, improving global security governance, and encouraging joint international efforts to achieve lasting peace and stable development.

Its six core commitments emphasize, among other principles, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, serious consideration of the legitimate security concerns of all countries, and the settlement of disputes through dialogue rather than confrontation or bloc politics.

China’s objection to the war was therefore not simply an objection to its timing or costs. It represented an objection to the underlying logic of the conflict itself: a zero-sum conception of security according to which one actor’s security may be achieved by undermining the sovereignty and security of another.¹⁵

Particularly significant in this context is one of the central principles underpinning the Global Security Initiative: the security of one country should not be pursued at the expense of the security of another.

This principle does more than articulate a general vision of international relations. It also provides a direct interpretive key to understanding China’s position on the war against Iran.

From Beijing’s perspective, the United States and Israel were attempting to reshape regional security through force—that is, by imposing a security framework based on weakening Iran militarily and politically. China’s position, however, suggests that even if such an approach were to produce tactical gains, it would ultimately create a more fragile regional security architecture, because the destruction or severe weakening of the security of a major Gulf actor would inevitably generate broader vulnerabilities affecting energy security, maritime routes, and neighboring Arab states.

This explains China’s simultaneous emphasis on the security of Iran and the security of the Gulf states, rather than framing the security of one side as inherently opposed to that of the other.¹⁶

This perspective is closely connected to the concept of global governance, as articulated by China in 2025.

In the most recent official formulations, Beijing has presented four global initiatives: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative, while presenting the Belt and Road Initiative as an important practical vehicle for advancing this broader vision.

In his remarks on March 8, 2026, Wang Yi stated that the Global Governance Initiative had come “at the right time,” noting that it had received a positive response from more than 150 countries and organizations. He directly linked the initiative to revitalizing the role of the United Nations and building a more just and equitable international order.¹⁷

From this perspective, the war against Iran is viewed in China as a test of the international governance architecture itself: Is the use of force to be left to the unilateral will of major powers, or should it remain constrained by international law and multilateral institutions?

This question becomes especially important when one considers that Beijing’s criticism of the war is not based solely on its material costs, but also on China’s preferred vision of international order.

Chinese discourse on global governance repeatedly emphasizes opposition to the “law of the jungle,” support for the central role of the United Nations, and resistance to unilateralism and hegemony.

These concepts are not merely rhetorical slogans. The war against Iran therefore appeared, from the Chinese perspective, as a dual threat: a threat to regional stability and a threat to the principle Beijing seeks to reinforce in opposition to U.S. military hegemony—the principle that legitimacy should not be reduced to the possession or exercise of superior force.¹⁸

The Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) provides another important dimension.

Proposed by Xi Jinping in March 2023, the initiative calls for respect for the diversity of civilizations, adherence to shared human values, rejection of attempts to impose values or models on other societies, and encouragement of dialogue and mutual learning among civilizations.

This discourse is not marginal to understanding China’s position on the war. Beijing tends to view Middle Eastern crises as becoming more severe when they are managed through a logic of civilizational exclusion, moral superiority, or attempts to reshape societies and political systems from outside.

China’s opposition to the war against Iran therefore derives not only from considerations of international law and energy security, but also from a deeper rejection of the notion that violence can serve as a legitimate instrument for politically and civilizationally re-engineering the region.¹⁹

This conceptual framework is completed by the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Official Chinese reports on the Global Development Initiative emphasize that the world faces overlapping challenges arising from conflict, protectionism, and economic slowdown, and that development remains humanity’s broadest common interest and one of the most important pathways for addressing crises.

Similarly, China’s white paper on the Belt and Road Initiative describes it as a major pillar for building a global community of shared future based on peace, cooperation, openness, and mutual benefit.

From this perspective, the Gulf is more than a source of oil and natural gas for China. It is a central node in networks of connectivity, trade, energy, infrastructure, and civilizational interaction.

The war against Iran is therefore also understood in Beijing as a threat to the very environment necessary for development, connectivity, and dialogue—not merely as an isolated security crisis.²⁰

The fundamental conclusion is that the roots of China’s position are structural rather than merely tactical or situational.

China opposes the war because, in its view, it represents the opposite of what Beijing seeks to institutionalize through its global initiatives: common security instead of zero-sum security; the rule of international law instead of the legitimacy of force; civilizational dialogue instead of exclusion; and development and economic connectivity instead of the destruction of the conditions necessary for stability.

China’s position on the war against Iran should therefore not be understood simply as an expression of immediate interests in oil or as an attempt to protect a regional partner. At a deeper level, it constitutes a defense of the type of regional and international order that Beijing seeks to promote.²¹

V. How Do Chinese Scholars View the War and China’s Position?

The views expressed by Chinese scholars indicate that China’s academic and analytical community does not fundamentally diverge from the official position, but tends to place it within a broader explanatory framework.

The Global Times, for example, cited scholars including Pan Guang, Ding Long, and Wang Zichuang, who argued that U.S.–Israeli strikes against a sovereign state without a legitimate legal basis constituted a dangerous precedent and a significant shock to the international order established after the Second World War.

Some Chinese scholars also interpreted the conflict as a potentially prolonged war of attrition rather than a short, surgical military operation. They suggested that its objectives might extend beyond weakening Iran’s military capabilities to exhausting the Iranian state or generating deeper internal political transformations.²²

Chinese scholars also devote particular attention to energy security and maritime routes.

From their perspective, the war tests not only China’s relations with Iran and the Arab Gulf states, but also exposes the vulnerability of Asian—and particularly Chinese—dependence on the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

Their analyses therefore repeatedly characterize China as a de-escalatory power rather than a military actor, suggesting that the most Beijing can realistically do is work to reduce escalation, safeguard maritime navigation, and facilitate a return to negotiations.

This characterization is significant because it directly connects Chinese scholarly assessments with the structural nature of China’s regional role: **expanding interests on the one hand, but deliberately limited security and military instruments on the other.**²³

VI. How Is China’s Position Assessed Outside China?

Assessments of China’s position outside China reveal a broad spectrum of interpretations.

Some view Beijing as a relatively balanced actor whose interests are best served by stability and whose discourse is therefore consistent with its actual strategic needs. Others argue that China’s position remains largely rhetorical because Beijing lacks either the willingness or the capability to assume direct security responsibilities commensurate with the scale of its economic presence.

A third perspective sees China as attempting to derive a relative strategic advantage from the crisis: allowing the United States to bear the military and political costs of the conflict while Beijing presents itself as an advocate of peace, sovereignty, international law, and multilateralism.²⁴

From an Arab perspective, none of these interpretations alone is sufficient.

China does indeed benefit politically from contrasting its discourse with the U.S. use of military force. Yet reducing Beijing’s position to mere propaganda overlooks the fact that China has substantial material interests threatened by the war.

Similarly, describing China as a neutral actor is not entirely accurate, because Beijing clearly opposed the legality and political logic of the U.S.–Israeli military campaign.

A more precise description would be that China is a non-belligerent but interested actor: it is not neutral regarding the principles governing the conflict, but it is cautious about translating its political opposition into direct strategic confrontation.

This distinction is essential for understanding both the opportunities and limitations of China’s role.²⁵

External assessments also differ over whether China possesses meaningful leverage over Iran.

The strategic partnership between Beijing and Tehran, China’s importance as an economic partner, and its diplomatic role in facilitating the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement in 2023 have led some observers to assume that China can exercise decisive influence over Iranian behavior.

This assumption, however, exaggerates the nature of the relationship.

China has influence over Iran, but influence is not the same as control.

Iran is an autonomous regional power with its own security doctrine, domestic political dynamics, network of regional relationships, and perception of existential threats. Beijing can encourage restraint, facilitate communication, and offer diplomatic or economic incentives, but it cannot simply dictate Tehran’s strategic choices—particularly during a war perceived by Iranian decision-makers as directly threatening the survival of the state and regime.²⁶

This distinction also applies to China’s relations with the Gulf states.

The expansion of economic ties between China and the GCC has sometimes encouraged interpretations suggesting that Beijing is gradually replacing Washington in the region. Yet the war demonstrated the limits of this assumption.

China is an indispensable economic partner for many Gulf states, but it is not yet an alternative security guarantor.

The United States continues to possess the military infrastructure, defense partnerships, intelligence capabilities, and operational presence necessary to respond rapidly to regional threats.

China, by contrast, has deliberately avoided constructing a comparable security architecture.

The war therefore exposed a fundamental asymmetry in China’s Gulf role: **its economic importance has grown faster than its security responsibilities.**²⁷

VII. The War’s Repercussions for Chinese Interests

The most immediate impact of the war on China concerns energy security.

China is the world’s largest importer of crude oil, and the Gulf remains central to its energy supply structure. Any prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on Gulf energy facilities, or sustained increase in oil and gas prices would impose significant costs on the Chinese economy.

Even when physical supplies are not completely interrupted, heightened geopolitical risk increases transportation, insurance, and financing costs, while volatility in energy prices complicates economic planning.

For Beijing, therefore, the security of the Gulf is inseparable from China’s own economic security.²⁸

The war also highlights a broader strategic vulnerability: China’s dependence on maritime routes that it does not militarily control.

A substantial share of China’s energy imports and commercial flows passes through maritime chokepoints extending from the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz through the Indian Ocean and onward toward East Asia.

These routes remain protected largely by an international security architecture in which the United States continues to play a dominant role.

This creates a strategic paradox.

China benefits economically from an open maritime order whose security has historically depended to a considerable extent on U.S. military power, while simultaneously opposing what it views as Washington’s hegemonic use of that power.

The war against Iran brought this contradiction into sharper focus.²⁹

A prolonged conflict could also affect the Belt and Road Initiative.

China’s projects across the Middle East are built on assumptions of connectivity, predictable investment environments, stable energy flows, and functioning logistics networks.

Regional war undermines all four.

Infrastructure projects become riskier, insurance costs rise, investment decisions are delayed, and the strategic value of economic corridors can be weakened by political fragmentation.

For China, therefore, stability in the Gulf and the wider Middle East is not merely desirable in diplomatic terms; it is a prerequisite for the viability of its long-term geo-economic strategy.³⁰

The war also has implications for Chinese nationals and companies operating in the region.

As China’s economic footprint has expanded, so too has its exposure to regional instability.

Chinese workers, investments, industrial projects, ports, logistics facilities, and commercial assets increasingly require protection during crises.

This raises a question that will become more pressing as China’s global presence grows: Can Beijing continue to expand economically in high-risk regions without developing corresponding mechanisms for crisis management, evacuation, asset protection, and security coordination?

The evacuation of Chinese citizens from previous conflict zones demonstrated Beijing’s growing capacity for emergency response, but such operations remain different from providing sustained regional security guarantees.³¹

The war may therefore accelerate an internal Chinese debate over the relationship between overseas interests and overseas security capabilities.

China has traditionally emphasized non-interference and avoided permanent military entanglements. Yet the expansion of its global economic presence inevitably creates pressure for a more active role in protecting its interests.

The challenge for Beijing will be to do so without reproducing the model of military interventionism that it has long criticized in Western foreign policy.

This tension between expanding interests and restrained security commitments is likely to become one of the defining dilemmas of Chinese foreign policy in the coming years.³²

VIII. Implications for China–Gulf Relations

The war reinforces the strategic importance of the Gulf in China’s foreign policy.

For Beijing, the GCC states are not merely energy suppliers. They are increasingly important investment partners, financial actors, logistics hubs, technology markets, and participants in China’s broader vision of Eurasian connectivity.

At the same time, Gulf states view China as a major economic and technological partner capable of contributing to their national development strategies and economic diversification programs.

This mutual interest provides a strong foundation for deeper relations.³³

Yet the war also exposes the limitations of the relationship.

Gulf states may welcome China’s diplomatic opposition to attacks on their sovereignty, energy infrastructure, and maritime security, but they are also likely to assess Beijing according to its capacity to contribute materially to regional stability.

Statements supporting Gulf security are politically significant, but during an acute military crisis, states ultimately distinguish between diplomatic support and operational security capability.

This does not diminish China’s importance, but it clarifies the nature of its current role.

Beijing is increasingly a strategic economic partner and diplomatic actor, but not yet a comprehensive security provider.³⁴

From a Gulf perspective, this reality reinforces the logic of strategic hedging.

The Gulf states are unlikely to choose between the United States and China in a simple binary manner.

Instead, they will continue seeking to preserve U.S. security partnerships while expanding economic, technological, and diplomatic relations with China.

The war may actually strengthen this approach rather than weaken it.

If reliance on a single external power creates vulnerability, diversification becomes a rational strategy.

Yet diversification does not mean equidistance. Different partners provide different forms of strategic value.

The United States remains central to hard security, while China’s comparative advantages lie primarily in trade, investment, infrastructure, technology, energy interdependence, and diplomatic engagement.³⁵

The most important question for the future of China–Gulf relations is therefore whether Beijing will gradually expand its security role.

Such expansion need not take the form of military alliances or permanent bases modeled on the U.S. presence.

China could instead develop a distinctive security role centered on maritime security, mediation, crisis prevention, peacekeeping, protection of commercial routes, cybersecurity cooperation, and multilateral security mechanisms.

This would be more consistent with Beijing’s declared principles and more acceptable to Gulf states seeking diversified partnerships without entering new rigid alliance structures.³⁶

The war may also strengthen Gulf expectations that China use its relationship with Iran more actively.

The Saudi–Iranian agreement brokered with Chinese support in 2023 created an image of Beijing as a power capable of facilitating regional détente.

If China wishes to preserve the credibility generated by that diplomatic achievement, it may increasingly be expected to help prevent renewed confrontation between Iran and its Arab neighbors.

This does not mean that Beijing can guarantee Iranian behavior. But it does mean that its regional diplomatic standing will increasingly be judged by whether it can convert access to multiple parties into practical de-escalation mechanisms.³⁷

IX. Implications for China–U.S. Relations

The war introduces a new source of complexity into U.S.–China strategic competition.

Before the outbreak of hostilities, Beijing and Washington had been attempting to manage their economic and political disputes through limited stabilization mechanisms.

The war, however, reintroduced military power, energy security, and Middle Eastern geopolitics into the bilateral equation.

China’s condemnation of U.S. military action reinforced the broader ideological and political divide between the two powers over the meaning of international order.

Washington tends to justify the use of force in terms of deterrence, national security, and the prevention of strategic threats. Beijing, by contrast, emphasizes sovereignty, Security Council authorization, non-interference, and negotiated settlement.

The disagreement is therefore not limited to Iran. It reflects competing conceptions of legitimate power in the international system.³⁸

At the same time, China is unlikely to seek direct confrontation with the United States over Iran.

Iran is important to Beijing, but not to the extent that China would risk a major military confrontation with Washington.

China’s priorities remain broader: economic stability, technological competition, Taiwan, regional influence in East Asia, and the long-term restructuring of the international order.

Beijing is therefore likely to continue opposing U.S. policy diplomatically while avoiding steps that could transform the Iranian crisis into a direct Sino-American confrontation.³⁹

This creates an interesting strategic dynamic.

The United States bears the immediate military costs and risks of intervention, while China can criticize the war and present itself as a defender of diplomatic solutions.

If the conflict becomes prolonged and costly, Beijing may gain reputational advantages in parts of the Global South, particularly among states already critical of unilateral military intervention.

However, such gains should not be exaggerated.

If China is perceived as unable to protect its partners, secure maritime routes, or influence the behavior of states with which it maintains close relations, its image as a rising global power could also face questions.

The war therefore creates both opportunities and risks for China’s international standing.⁴⁰

There is also a Taiwan dimension.

Chinese strategists are likely to study the war carefully for lessons concerning U.S. military doctrine, long-range strikes, missile defense, logistics, alliance coordination, intelligence capabilities, and the political management of escalation.

Washington, likewise, may draw conclusions about the risks of simultaneous crises across multiple theaters.

A major Middle Eastern conflict consumes military resources, political attention, and strategic bandwidth that might otherwise be directed toward the Indo-Pacific.

From Beijing’s perspective, this may provide temporary strategic relief, but it also demonstrates the United States’ willingness to use force in pursuit of high-priority security objectives.

The lessons of the Iran war will therefore inevitably enter strategic calculations surrounding Taiwan, even if the two cases are fundamentally different.⁴¹

X. Opportunities and Limits of Chinese Mediation

China possesses several advantages that could enable it to play a meaningful diplomatic role in ending or containing the war.

First, it maintains channels of communication with Iran, the Gulf states, Russia, Europe, and the United States.

Second, unlike Washington, Beijing is not directly involved in military operations, which gives it greater political flexibility.

Third, its role in facilitating the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement established a precedent for Chinese mediation in the region.

Fourth, China’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council gives it an institutional platform through which diplomatic initiatives can be advanced.⁴²

China’s approach is also attractive to some regional actors because it emphasizes political settlement without attaching explicit ideological or governance conditions.

Beijing does not demand domestic political reform as a prerequisite for engagement, nor does it openly seek regime change.

This can make Chinese diplomacy more acceptable to states concerned about sovereignty and foreign interference.

Its emphasis on development and economic incentives may also provide tools for supporting post-conflict stabilization if a political settlement is eventually reached.⁴³

Nevertheless, China’s mediation capacity faces substantial limitations.

The first is that mediation requires leverage, not merely good relations.

China may have economic influence over Iran, but its leverage over Israel is considerably more limited, while Washington remains the external actor with the greatest ability to influence Israeli decision-making.

A comprehensive settlement would therefore be extremely difficult without U.S. participation.

China can facilitate, encourage, and provide diplomatic frameworks, but it cannot independently impose a settlement on the principal belligerents.⁴⁴

The second limitation concerns security guarantees.

Any durable agreement may require mechanisms to reassure the parties regarding future threats, military capabilities, nuclear issues, missile programs, and regional security arrangements.

China has not traditionally offered the kind of binding military guarantees that might be necessary for such an agreement.

Its preference is to support political understandings and multilateral frameworks rather than become directly responsible for enforcing security commitments.

This reduces both the risks Beijing must bear and the extent of its influence over final outcomes.⁴⁵

The third limitation is the persistence of distrust among the parties.

Iran may welcome Chinese political support but remain cautious about excessive dependence on Beijing. Gulf states value relations with China but do not necessarily view it as a substitute for their established security partnerships. Israel may perceive China as politically closer to Iran and the Arab position, while Washington may resist any diplomatic framework that significantly expands Chinese influence in a strategically vital region.

China’s mediation role is therefore constrained not only by its own capabilities but also by the strategic perceptions of the other actors.⁴⁶

A realistic assessment is that China is better positioned to serve as a facilitator of de-escalation than as the sole architect of a comprehensive peace settlement.

It can help establish communication channels, support ceasefires, promote regional dialogue, work through the United Nations, and provide economic incentives.

It may also contribute to a broader multilateral arrangement involving the United States, European powers, Russia, the Gulf states, and other regional actors.

Such a role would be consistent with China’s preference for multilateral diplomacy and would avoid forcing Beijing into responsibilities it is not yet willing to assume alone.⁴⁷

XI. An Arab Assessment: What Does China’s Position Mean for the Region?

From an Arab perspective, China’s position contains several positive elements.

Its rejection of attacks on Gulf states, civilian infrastructure, energy facilities, and maritime routes directly corresponds with core Arab and Gulf interests.

Its emphasis on sovereignty and territorial integrity is particularly important for a region that has repeatedly suffered from foreign intervention, state fragmentation, and wars whose consequences have extended far beyond their original objectives.

China’s call for an immediate ceasefire and negotiated settlement also aligns with the interest of Arab states in preventing the region from becoming the arena of an open-ended confrontation among larger powers.⁴⁸

China’s discourse on common security is also relevant to the Gulf.

The region’s history demonstrates the limits of security systems based entirely on excluding or defeating one major regional actor.

Attempts to build Gulf security against Iran without incorporating Iran into some form of regional security dialogue have repeatedly produced cycles of escalation.

At the same time, any framework that ignores the legitimate security concerns of the Arab Gulf states is equally unsustainable.

The Chinese concept that the security of one state should not come at the expense of another therefore offers a potentially useful normative foundation for a more inclusive regional security architecture.⁴⁹

However, an Arab assessment must also remain critical.

Principles alone do not protect states during wars.

China’s growing economic presence in the region creates expectations that Beijing should contribute more substantially to regional security.

If China wishes to be regarded as a major power with a distinctive global vision, it will eventually face pressure to translate its principles into institutions, mechanisms, and capabilities.

The gap between discourse and implementation cannot remain indefinitely unresolved.

The central question is therefore whether China is willing to bear a greater share of the costs associated with the international order it seeks to promote.⁵⁰

Arab states should not, however, respond by attempting to replace dependence on the United States with dependence on China.

Such a strategy would merely reproduce the same structural vulnerability under a different external partner.

The more rational approach is to use the emergence of China, alongside India, Europe, and other powers, to broaden strategic options and reduce excessive dependence on any single actor.

The goal should be strategic autonomy through diversified partnerships, not the substitution of one patron for another.⁵¹

This requires Arab and Gulf states to strengthen their own capacities.

External powers can support regional security, but they cannot substitute for regional agency.

The war demonstrates the importance of integrated air and missile defense, maritime security cooperation, protection of critical infrastructure, crisis diplomacy, energy resilience, and mechanisms for managing relations with Iran.

It also demonstrates the need for Arab states to develop a collective vision of the type of regional order they seek, rather than merely reacting to competing American, Chinese, Iranian, Israeli, or other external strategies.⁵²

China can contribute to such an order, particularly through economic integration, diplomatic mediation, support for multilateral institutions, and relations with all sides.

But the Arab world must define its own interests first.

The value of China’s role will ultimately depend on how effectively Arab states incorporate Beijing into a broader strategy designed by the region itself.

In this sense, the most important question is not whether China will replace the United States, but whether the growing plurality of international powers can be used to create a more balanced regional environment in which Arab states possess greater room for independent action.⁵³

XII. Future Scenarios for China’s Role

Several scenarios can be envisioned for the future development of China’s role following the war.

The first is continued diplomatic restraint.

Under this scenario, Beijing would maintain its existing approach: condemning violations of sovereignty, supporting ceasefires, engaging in mediation, and protecting its economic interests without assuming major new security commitments.

This is perhaps the most likely scenario in the short term because it is consistent with China’s traditional risk aversion in Middle Eastern security affairs.⁵⁴

The second scenario is incremental security expansion.

China could gradually increase its involvement in maritime security, joint exercises, arms sales, intelligence cooperation, crisis evacuation mechanisms, and the protection of commercial routes.

Such an expansion would not necessarily transform China into a U.S.-style security guarantor, but it would narrow the gap between its economic interests and security capabilities.

The war may accelerate this trajectory if Beijing concludes that its overseas interests can no longer be protected primarily through diplomacy and economic interdependence.⁵⁵

The third scenario is multilateral security activism.

China could seek to institutionalize regional dialogue through a Gulf security forum or a broader Middle Eastern mechanism based on the principles of common security.

Such an initiative could involve Iran, the GCC states, Iraq, and other regional actors, with the support of major international powers.

Its agenda might include maritime security, non-aggression principles, protection of energy infrastructure, crisis communication, missile and drone risks, and eventually nuclear security.

This scenario would most clearly translate China’s Global Security Initiative into a practical regional framework.⁵⁶

The fourth scenario is strategic retrenchment.

If the war produces prolonged instability, severe economic costs, or direct threats to Chinese interests without creating opportunities for effective diplomacy, Beijing may become more cautious about deepening its regional exposure.

China could focus more heavily on diversifying energy supplies, reducing vulnerability to Gulf chokepoints, and limiting investments in politically unstable environments.

Although this scenario appears less consistent with China’s long-term economic engagement in the region, it cannot be excluded if instability becomes chronic.⁵⁷

The actual trajectory will likely combine elements of the first three scenarios.

China is unlikely to abandon diplomatic restraint entirely, but the structural expansion of its interests will gradually push it toward a larger security role.

The key question is not whether China will become more involved, but what form that involvement will take.

If Beijing seeks to reproduce the traditional military alliance model, it risks contradicting its own discourse and entering costly geopolitical competition.

If, however, it develops a distinctive model combining diplomacy, economic interdependence, multilateral security mechanisms, and limited protective capabilities, it may gradually establish a role that differs substantially from the American model.⁵⁸

Conclusion

China’s position on the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran reveals both the growing coherence of Beijing’s global vision and the persistent limitations of its capacity to translate that vision into direct strategic outcomes.

China opposed the war because it viewed it as inconsistent with the principles it has increasingly placed at the center of its foreign policy: state sovereignty, non-interference, the authority of the United Nations, common security, political settlement of disputes, civilizational dialogue, and development as a foundation for stability.

In this respect, China’s position was not merely tactical or opportunistic. It was rooted in a broader intellectual and strategic framework reflected in the Global Security Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Civilization Initiative, the Global Governance Initiative, and the Belt and Road Initiative.

At the same time, the war exposed the gap between China’s expanding interests and its limited security role.

Beijing is deeply dependent on Gulf energy, heavily invested in regional stability, increasingly important to Arab development strategies, and politically connected to both Iran and the Gulf states.

Yet it remains reluctant to assume the military and security burdens traditionally associated with great-power influence.

This creates a fundamental contradiction: China seeks a larger role in shaping the regional and international order while remaining cautious about bearing the costs required to enforce that order.

From an Arab perspective, China’s position should neither be romanticized nor dismissed.

Its emphasis on sovereignty, ceasefire, common security, and political settlement corresponds with important Arab interests.

Its relations with Iran, the Gulf states, and the broader Global South also provide it with diplomatic opportunities unavailable to many Western powers.

However, China cannot currently replace the United States as a security guarantor, nor can it independently impose a settlement on a conflict involving actors over whom its leverage is uneven.

Its most realistic role lies in facilitating de-escalation, supporting multilateral diplomacy, protecting economic and maritime stability, and contributing to a more inclusive regional security architecture.

The broader lesson for Arab states is equally important.

The transformation of the international system should not be understood as a choice between Washington and Beijing.

A multipolar world creates opportunities only for states capable of defining their own priorities and managing diversified partnerships strategically.

For the Gulf and the wider Arab region, the objective should therefore be neither to remain permanently dependent on the American security umbrella nor to search for a Chinese substitute.

Rather, it should be to construct greater strategic autonomy by combining stronger indigenous capabilities with balanced relations among multiple international powers.

The war against Iran may ultimately become a defining test of China’s rise as a global power.

If Beijing can translate its concepts of common security, global governance, and political settlement into practical diplomatic mechanisms capable of reducing conflict and protecting regional stability, it will strengthen its claim to offer a distinctive model of international leadership.

If, however, its role remains confined primarily to statements, economic interests, and limited mediation, the gap between China’s global discourse and its strategic capabilities will remain evident.

For the Arab world, the central issue is therefore not whether China is “with” or “against” any particular regional actor.

The more consequential question is whether China’s rise can contribute to the emergence of a regional order that is less dependent on unilateral force, more respectful of sovereignty, more inclusive in its conception of security, and more conducive to development and stability.

The answer will depend not only on Beijing’s choices, but also on the ability of Arab states themselves to shape the emerging multipolar order rather than merely adapt to it.