Middle Powers and the Reshaping of International Multilateralism: Toward a More Flexible Approach to Crisis Management

Introduction

Amid intensifying great-power competition and the declining effectiveness of international institutions in addressing a range of security and economic crises, growing attention is being paid to the role that middle powers can play in preserving international stability and strengthening opportunities for multilateral cooperation. These countries returned to the forefront of diplomatic debate during the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 2024, as policymakers searched for alternative approaches to limiting international polarization and expanding the room for maneuver available to states that lack the capabilities of great powers but possess sufficient regional, economic, or diplomatic weight to influence international affairs.

The concept of middle powers is no longer confined to classifying states according to the size of their economies or their military capabilities. Increasingly, it is associated with their ability to build partnerships, facilitate understandings between competing parties, and develop flexible cooperation arrangements that respond to specific threats. In this context, the diplomatic experiences of countries such as Finland, Australia, and Canada, alongside powers from the Global South, including Indonesia and Egypt, highlight efforts to preserve foreign-policy autonomy and strengthen the capacity to maneuver within an international environment characterized by multiple centers of power and declining strategic predictability.

These developments form part of a broader debate over the future of international multilateralism and the ability of middle powers to contribute to crisis management when global institutions struggle to reach binding agreements. Analyzing their role therefore requires moving beyond the view of middle powers as a descriptive category within the international hierarchy of power and toward understanding them as actors capable, under certain conditions, of developing more flexible diplomatic, security, and economic arrangements.

First: The Rise of Middle Powers Amid Geopolitical Transformations

Statements by several international leaders in 2024 reflected growing interest in strengthening cooperation among middle powers. In August of that year, Finnish President Alexander Stubb called for expanding relations with middle powers in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Central Asia. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese also described Australia as a “constructive middle power,” signaling his country’s ambition to use its international position and network of relationships to support cooperation and stability.

These positions reflected a growing recognition that developments in the international system no longer allow middle powers to rely exclusively on existing institutions or traditional alignments. Intensifying competition between the United States and China, continuing wars and regional conflicts, and mounting pressures on supply chains, trade, and energy have all encouraged these countries to seek additional tools to protect their interests and broaden their strategic options.

At the same time, countries in the Global South have adopted approaches aimed at preserving national decision-making autonomy and avoiding dependence on competing geopolitical blocs. Indonesia provides an example through its foreign-policy doctrine of “independent and active” engagement, which emphasizes autonomous decision-making and active participation in international affairs without subordination to any single major power. Under President Prabowo Subianto, translating this principle into practical partnerships has become particularly significant amid intensifying geopolitical competition across the Indo-Pacific.

This trend does not mean that middle powers necessarily share a unified vision of the international order or identical interests and priorities. Differences in geographical location, economic structure, and security commitments produce varying approaches. Nevertheless, these countries increasingly share an interest in expanding strategic autonomy, diversifying partnerships, and reducing the risks associated with excessive dependence on a single actor.

Second: Amr Moussa and Diplomacy as an Instrument for Expanding Influence

Within this context, the perspectives advanced by former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amr Moussa on the role of states outside the category of great powers carry analytical significance. During his participation in the work of the United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2003, Moussa addressed issues related to the effectiveness of the international system and the ability of states to influence responses to shared challenges. These themes subsequently reappeared in his later intellectual and media contributions.

The significance of this perspective lies in its emphasis on diplomacy as a means of narrowing the gap between material capabilities and political influence. States that lack the military or economic resources of major powers can, in certain circumstances, expand their influence through mediation, consensus-building, cultural engagement, and the use of soft-power instruments to strengthen trust and create conditions conducive to conflict resolution.

In his keynote address at the Karama Summit in Fez in June, Moussa addressed issues related to cultural diplomacy, soft power, and their role in supporting peace and conflict prevention, alongside the search for new models of governance. These themes align with the broader debate over the capacity of middle powers to develop instruments of influence that rely not exclusively on military or economic capabilities, but also on diplomatic legitimacy and the ability to engage with multiple parties.

The effectiveness of these instruments, however, remains dependent on other enabling conditions, including clearly defined national interests, policy continuity, the ability to honor commitments, and the availability of economic or institutional resources to support diplomatic initiatives. Soft power is not a complete substitute for material power, but it can amplify its impact or provide states with relatively limited resources with greater opportunities to influence the international environment.

Third: The Crisis of Collective Security and the Search for More Flexible Arrangements

The collective security system faces mounting challenges as major powers struggle to reach consensus within international institutions, particularly the United Nations Security Council. This has contributed to the international community’s limited capacity to respond effectively to certain protracted conflicts, contain regional escalation, and ensure compliance with international rules when the strategic interests of influential states collide.

This impasse does not necessarily signify the collapse of collective security or the end of the United Nations’ role. Rather, it exposes a gap between the legal and institutional principles underpinning the international system and the practical ability to implement them when the interests of major powers come into conflict. Against this backdrop, middle powers face challenges extending beyond their national borders, including the consequences of proxy wars, disruptions to trade routes, declining energy security, supply-chain instability, and mounting economic pressures resulting from regional crises.

These conditions have prompted a number of middle powers to explore more flexible forms of cooperation rather than confining their actions to fixed blocs or arrangements that leave insufficient room to respond to changing circumstances. Such efforts include diversifying economic partnerships, strengthening regional security coordination, maintaining communication channels with competing parties, and participating in targeted initiatives to address specific crises.

This trend reflects a relative shift away from exclusive reliance on comprehensive multilateralism toward what may be described as “flexible multilateralism” or issue-specific multilateral cooperation. This approach brings together a group of states around shared interests or a particular challenge, such as protecting maritime routes, securing energy flows, addressing trade disruptions, or containing a regional conflict.

The importance of these arrangements lies in their ability to overcome some of the obstacles facing broader institutions by focusing on practical objectives around which agreement may be more readily achieved. Their success, however, depends on clearly defined mandates, respect for international law, and safeguards against their becoming parallel frameworks that undermine existing institutions or exclude parties affected by the issues under consideration.

Fourth: Strategic Flexibility Between Decision-Making Autonomy and Alliance Commitments

Middle powers adopt different approaches depending on their geopolitical positions and the nature of their security and economic ties. Western countries such as Canada and Australia operate within a framework that combines commitments to traditional alliances, particularly their security relationships with the United States, with the need to diversify partnerships and preserve their economic and diplomatic interests.

Middle powers in the Global South, such as Indonesia and Egypt, face different challenges related to maintaining decision-making autonomy, managing pressure arising from competition among major powers, and capitalizing on their geographical positions and regional and international networks. This does not necessarily mean that these countries pursue neutrality or avoid taking clear positions. Rather, the central objective is to manage external relations in ways that advance national interests and reduce the risks of dependence on a single partner.

In this context, strategic flexibility emerges as an approach to risk management and the expansion of policy options, rather than merely a strategy for balancing competing powers. It enables states to diversify their economic and security relationships, maintain dialogue channels during crises, and avoid allowing international disputes to impose permanent constraints on their foreign-policy choices.

Such flexibility, however, does not imply an absence of principles or the continuous adoption of contradictory positions. Effective foreign policy requires combining realism in assessing the balance of power with clarity in defining national interests and legal commitments. It also requires state institutions to coordinate economic, security, and diplomatic decisions to ensure that partnership diversification does not result in strategic fragmentation.

The success of middle powers should therefore be measured not simply by the number of partnerships they establish, but by their ability to transform those relationships into practical instruments for strengthening national security, expanding development opportunities, and reducing exposure to external shocks.

Fifth: Regional Coordination and Crisis Management in the Middle East

The Middle East represents an important arena in which to assess the ability of middle powers to develop practical mechanisms for crisis management. Regional conflicts are interconnected, security and economic interests overlap, and international powers continue to exert direct influence over regional balances.

When traditional international diplomatic channels encounter obstacles, coordination among regional powers can help contain escalation, preserve communication channels, and create conditions for the resumption of negotiations. This includes cooperation among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, given their regional weight and the breadth of their political, economic, and security relationships.

The potential of such coordination should not, however, be overstated. Differences in national priorities and divergent positions on certain regional issues may limit the prospects for building sustainable common positions. Developing cooperation therefore requires identifying areas of overlapping interests, distinguishing between issues on which progress is possible and those that remain contentious, and avoiding assumptions of comprehensive strategic alignment among the parties.

The protection of maritime routes, freedom of navigation, and supply-chain security stand out as promising areas for practical cooperation because of their direct implications for international trade, energy security, and regional economies. Diplomatic and security coordination can also help reduce the risks of miscalculation, strengthen information-sharing, and support initiatives aimed at de-escalation.

For Egypt, this approach is particularly important given its geographical position, its interests in the stability of the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Eastern Mediterranean, and its role in several Arab and regional issues. Leveraging these assets offers opportunities to strengthen Egypt’s diplomatic presence, provided that external engagement is supported by institutional and economic capabilities capable of sustaining its effectiveness.

Sixth: The Future of International Multilateralism and the Role of Middle Powers

Current developments suggest that international multilateralism is not necessarily disappearing; rather, the forms through which it operates and the distribution of initiative within it are changing. Alongside major international institutions, regional understandings, limited-purpose working groups, and partnerships organized around specific issues are becoming increasingly important. This reflects a growing demand for more responsive and flexible mechanisms for addressing crises.

The future international system may therefore feature the coexistence of several levels of cooperation: global institutions that provide legitimacy and common rules, regional arrangements that respond to the specific characteristics of local challenges, and functional initiatives that bring states together around practical objectives. This transformation does not necessarily require flexible arrangements to replace traditional institutions. Instead, the different levels may complement one another if clear mechanisms for coordination and accountability are established.

One of the principal challenges is ensuring that these arrangements do not become selective frameworks serving the interests of a limited group of states at the expense of others. The effectiveness of flexible multilateralism will therefore continue to depend on its compatibility with international law, its capacity to strengthen cooperation rather than deepen polarization, and the willingness of participating states to involve parties affected by the decisions being made.

From this perspective, middle powers should not be regarded as substitutes for major powers or international institutions. Rather, they can help address certain gaps in global governance, provide additional channels for negotiation, and develop practical solutions to issues that cannot be adequately addressed through traditional frameworks alone.

Conclusion: Toward an Arab Strategy for Maximizing Influence

As 2027 approaches, Egyptian and Arab diplomacy faces the need to develop a more integrated approach to managing transformations in the international system. The priority is to maximize the capacity to influence outcomes by expanding regional partnerships, diversifying international relations, strengthening economic and security cooperation, protecting vital trade routes, and reinforcing state institutions and their ability to formulate coherent foreign policies.

Achieving these objectives requires moving beyond ad hoc coordination toward sustainable cooperation mechanisms based on identifying shared interests, establishing measurable objectives, and developing institutional channels for consultation and information-sharing. It also requires strengthening soft-power instruments and cultural diplomacy, alongside investment in the economic and technological capabilities that enable Arab states to expand their strategic autonomy.

At the same time, the concept of middle powers must be approached realistically. Geographical advantages and diplomatic weight alone do not guarantee influence. Success in this role depends on available resources, institutional cohesion, policy continuity, and the ability to build partnerships that translate political declarations into practical outcomes.

The ongoing transformation should therefore not be interpreted as the end of international multilateralism, but as a redistribution of its instruments and channels. As reliance on global institutions alone becomes increasingly insufficient for managing crises, middle powers can play an important role in supporting stability, provided they employ strategic flexibility within a clear framework of national interests and treat regional cooperation as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, international multilateralism.