Washington–Beijing: The Davidson Window and the Thucydides Trap

Despite the fact that developments in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf—particularly the U.S.–Iran confrontation—have captured widespread attention, the trajectory of U.S.–China relations, whether toward peace or conflict, continues to occupy a central place on the global agenda. This is especially true given the United States’ status as the current global hegemon and China’s undeniable rise as a major power.

Why revisit the dynamics shaping relations between these two great powers now?

Several factors are at play. Most notably, global attention was recently drawn to reports of a large-scale military exercise set to take place near China. Known as the “Balikatan” exercises—meaning “shoulder to shoulder” in Tagalog and conducted in the Philippines—this operation is expected to involve approximately 17,000 troops from the United States, Australia, Japan, Canada, France, and New Zealand.

Scheduled between April 20 and May 8, these exercises appear both significant and potentially provocative, particularly against a backdrop of heightened tensions with China, ongoing conflict in the Middle East, and a range of persistent flashpoints between Washington and Beijing. Chief among these are Taiwan, the South China Sea, and broader competition for influence in the Indo-Pacific. More recently, concerns have also intensified over the possibility of conflict between Japan and China, with Tokyo being a key U.S. ally. Such dynamics raise the specter of what is known as the “Thucydides Trap,” while also bringing into focus fears surrounding the so-called “Davidson Window.” But what exactly do these concepts entail?

Years ago, American political scientist Graham Allison warned that China and the United States could fall into what he termed the “Thucydides Trap”—the idea that war becomes likely when a rising power threatens to displace an established one. This concept draws on the writings of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who chronicled the great war between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century BCE.

However, while influential, this interpretation overlooks a critical dimension of the historical warning. According to Professor Joshua Rovner, author of Strategy and Grand Strategy, the conflict did not arise from an inevitable power transition. Rather, it followed a period of stable equilibrium between Athens, a dominant naval power, and Sparta, a formidable land power. As political crises deepened and diplomacy collapsed, both sides came to believe they could quickly secure victory. When war broke out, these expectations proved illusory, dragging both into a prolonged and devastating conflict. This, in essence, represents the true “Thucydides Trap.”

Are China and the United States now approaching such a scenario?

Many observers suggest the answer may be yes, particularly in light of developments in Venezuela—one of China’s key oil suppliers—as well as tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. These factors hint at a possible U.S. strategy aimed at constraining China’s access to vital energy sources, with oil serving as a critical lifeline for industry, agriculture, and the broader economy.

In this context, one might have expected Beijing to escalate. Yet statements by U.S. President Donald Trump, indicating that China has committed to halting arms exports to Iran, suggest that Beijing is instead seeking to avoid confrontation and may even be positioning itself as a mediator in efforts to resolve the crisis between Washington and Tehran.

Even so, such signals are insufficient to dispel concerns about a potential slide toward confrontation. Each power possesses distinct strategic advantages: China is a formidable land power, while the United States maintains overwhelming maritime superiority. Analysts continue to question China’s capacity for large-scale amphibious operations, though its defensive land capabilities remain unquestioned. Conversely, Washington’s unparalleled ability to project naval power across vast distances is clear. Yet neither side appears to have a decisive means of neutralizing the other’s strengths.

Does this mean the “Davidson Window” is truly approaching?

On March 9, 2021, during a high-level U.S. Senate hearing, Admiral Philip Davidson—then commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command—warned that China’s military development and strategic ambitions could pose a threat to Taiwan within six years, i.e., by 2027. Since then, this projection has been referred to as the “Davidson Window,” denoting a potential timeframe for military conflict over Taiwan.

This assessment has been reinforced by China’s ongoing military advancements, including increasingly sophisticated weapons systems, expansion of its nuclear arsenal—expected to reach around 1,000 warheads by 2030—and the rapid development of a naval fleet designed to rival that of the United States.

Against this backdrop, a critical question emerges: could tensions escalate into confrontation at a time when both sides are preparing for reciprocal high-level visits that might offer opportunities for de-escalation?

President Trump had been scheduled to visit China in early April, but developments related to the Iranian crisis led to the postponement of the trip to May 14, with Chinese President Xi Jinping expected to make a reciprocal visit thereafter.

It is well understood that U.S.–China relations are characterized by deep economic interdependence and delicate political balances, making direct confrontation an unattractive option for both sides. The real danger, however, lies in the possibility of accidental incidents triggering unintended escalation, potentially spiraling into a broader conflict.

In conclusion, the United States and China today appear to be treading a path not unlike that of Athens and Sparta. Each side seems to believe that emerging technologies could grant it a decisive edge, enabling a swift and low-cost victory. Yet history warns that such assumptions often lead in the opposite direction: toward prolonged and costly conflict.

The question remains open: will the anticipated diplomatic engagements provide a pathway out of this impasse, helping to avoid the Thucydides Trap and close the Davidson Window—or is the world on the brink of a new chapter in great power rivalry?