Scenarios for a U.S. Ground Operation in Iran: How Could It Unfold?

As the military confrontation between the United States and Iran continues to escalate, concerns are growing over the possibility that the conflict could enter a phase involving ground operations. This comes amid sustained and intensive U.S. airstrikes that have yet to achieve their intended objective of breaking Tehran’s will or compelling it to alter its military behavior. At the same time, control of the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as a central focus of the conflict, given its direct implications for global energy markets and their stability.

Against this backdrop, U.S. President Donald Trump has declined to rule out deploying ground forces to the theater of operations. Reports have also indicated that Washington has reinforced its military presence in the region by deploying additional forces, including special operations personnel and medical units, in a move intended to expand the range of military options available to the administration.

During a congressional hearing this week, several lawmakers asked senior military officials to clarify whether the administration was seriously considering a ground operation inside Iran. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine did not rule out the possibility, avoiding any disclosure as to whether ground combat represented the next phase of operations. He merely noted that “air power has limits,” while emphasizing that the U.S. military is continuously developing a broad range of operational options in preparation for different scenarios.

Despite these indications of escalation, a number of former U.S. military commanders and strategic experts argue that the current circumstances do not suggest that the United States is preparing to launch a large-scale ground invasion of Iran. Such an operation would require a force substantially larger than the approximately 50,000 U.S. troops currently deployed in the region. Nevertheless, they do not rule out limited ground operations, including the seizure of strategically important islands such as Kharg Island, or raids by special operations forces against specific military targets.

In this context, retired General Joseph Votel, who served as commander of U.S. Central Command from 2016 to 2019, said that he sees no indications that Washington intends to push its forces deep into Iranian territory or toward Tehran. He also ruled out the possibility that the administration is preparing ground operations aimed at Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Votel believes that the most likely scenario would involve limited ground raids targeting vital military installations, particularly capabilities that Iran relies upon to conduct its military operations. These could include assets located in coastal areas or at certain inland sites nearby. Potential targets could include command-and-control centers, missile-launch platforms, weapons and equipment storage facilities, communications nodes, and military infrastructure enabling Iran to continue influencing the course of operations in the Strait of Hormuz.

By contrast, Votel argues that any broader military operation, such as an attempt to seize portions of Iranian territory along the Strait of Hormuz in order to reopen the maritime passage, would require the deployment of at least 100,000 troops. Such an operation would therefore be highly complex and costly. He added that the geographical scale of the battlefield, combined with the prospect of fierce Iranian resistance, would significantly compound the military challenges facing U.S. forces.

Although the Iranian military is not considered one of the world’s most powerful conventional armed forces, it possesses the capacity to prolong a conflict and inflict casualties on an invading force. The United States would also face major logistical challenges in transporting troops and securing supplies because of Iran’s geography and the absence of a direct land-based staging area that could facilitate large-scale operations.

In this regard, experts point out that the U.S. invasion of Iraq benefited from Kuwait’s role as a major staging base for American forces. In the Iranian case, however, Washington lacks a comparable geographic gateway, further raising doubts about the feasibility of a comprehensive ground invasion.

Retired U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), likewise believes that the possibility of a large-scale ground operation inside Iran is virtually nonexistent. He described such an option as carrying extraordinary risks, particularly given that Iran has ground forces numbering close to one million personnel.

Cancian nevertheless believes that seizing certain strategically important islands represents a more feasible option. U.S. forces deployed in the region, including Marine Corps and airborne units, possess the capability to seize islands such as Kharg. However, such an operation would amount to a major battle, as American forces would be exposed to Iranian missile and drone attacks, making casualties almost inevitable. Even so, Iran would probably be unable to concentrate sufficient firepower to force U.S. forces to withdraw.

According to Cancian, the strategic significance of such an operation would lie in its use as leverage to compel Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Although Kharg Island is located roughly 400 miles from the strait, within the Persian Gulf, it constitutes the main artery for Iran’s oil exports. This makes it a strategic pressure point that could provide Washington with greater bargaining leverage in its confrontation with Tehran.

However, this scenario does not command a consensus among experts. While Votel acknowledges Kharg Island’s economic and strategic importance to Iran and believes that capturing it could yield limited tactical gains, he questions whether such an operation could fundamentally alter the balance of the conflict or guarantee the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. He also argues that it might not make a meaningful contribution to achieving the broader operational objectives that the United States could be pursuing.

Lawmakers in Washington likewise have serious concerns about the risks associated with deploying ground forces inside Iran, including any potential operations to seize islands. Democratic Representative Ted Lieu, a former U.S. Air Force officer and member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said he did not see how the United States could control an island without its forces coming under Iranian fire on a daily basis.

He added that the problem was not whether the U.S. military was capable of seizing territory—the United States clearly possesses that capability—but rather what would happen afterward.

Lieu explained that capturing territory does not mean that a war has ended. American forces would have to hold and secure the territory, which would constitute the real challenge. He argued that maintaining military operations to defend territory inside Iran would draw the United States into a prolonged war of attrition, similar to the extended conflicts that have exhausted American forces in the past.

Several Republican lawmakers have expressed similar concerns. Republican Representative Pat Harrigan, a former Green Beret and member of the House Armed Services Committee, described Iran as the “most dangerous flashpoint for conflict,” warning that deploying U.S. troops on Iranian territory would transform an already extremely dangerous confrontation into a prolonged war.

Deploying ground forces in Iran, regardless of the scale, would also constitute a major political risk for President Donald Trump and the Republican Party. A war that has contributed to rising fuel prices does not enjoy broad support among American voters. Republicans also understand that prolonging the conflict could undermine their narrow congressional majority in the midterm elections scheduled for November.

Nevertheless, Lieu emphasized that Trump’s record of making high-risk decisions makes the possibility of ground intervention difficult to dismiss. He cited Trump’s willingness earlier in the year to deploy ground forces to Venezuela, saying:

“I never underestimate Donald Trump’s ability to make reckless and harmful decisions. He appears to have a distorted view of reality, and I don’t believe he is receiving accurate information from his advisers. He seems isolated from bad news. Therefore, I believe that, in his own assessment, he could regard a ground invasion as a viable option.”

Meanwhile, a report published by The Washington Post stated that the U.S. Department of Defense had not fully briefed the White House on the extent of ammunition shortages resulting from the continuation of the war, potentially limiting Trump’s options for expanding military operations.

The White House, however, denied the allegations, insisting that there was no disagreement between the president and the Department of Defense. White House spokesperson Anna Kelly said that any claim that the commander in chief was not receiving accurate and timely information from the Pentagon was an “illogical claim.”

She added that the U.S. armed forces possessed sufficient ammunition, weapons, and military stockpiles to achieve all of President Trump’s strategic objectives—and more—arguing that Operation “Epic Fury” had clearly demonstrated the consequences of targeting the United States.

Kelly also said that President Trump had urged U.S. defense companies to continue increasing domestic weapons production, emphasizing that American-made weapons represent the best in the world.

These statements come as the Trump administration faces growing scrutiny over the objectives of the war, particularly after those objectives have repeatedly shifted, making it more difficult for the military establishment to carry out its missions within a coherent strategic framework.

In this regard, retired General Joseph Votel stressed that the U.S. armed forces had carried out all missions assigned to them with the highest degree of effectiveness. However, he noted that the real challenge lies in the lack of clarity regarding the war’s long-term strategic objectives, making it difficult to assess the direction in which military operations are ultimately heading.

Source: Hammurabi Center for Research and Strategic Studies