Breaking Bones

The latest U.S. strikes against Iran have been severe and consequential, while the risk of a wider regional conflict remains very real. Washington's objective in resuming these military operations is clear: to compel Tehran to make further concessions over its nuclear program and ensure the unrestricted reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. Iran, meanwhile, seeks to demonstrate resilience in order to establish new rules governing the strategic waterway while offering only limited concessions on the nuclear issue.

There is little doubt that the American strikes have inflicted significant damage. Iran's vulnerabilities remain evident, particularly its weak air defenses, the near absence of an effective air force, and the ease with which hostile aircraft have penetrated its airspace. Yet Tehran continues to retain important sources of leverage. It remains capable of threatening—if not partially disrupting—international maritime traffic, while also demonstrating its ability to strike neighboring Arab states and target U.S. military installations across the Gulf.

The greatest danger in this current war of attrition lies in two possible scenarios. The first is that U.S. operations could succeed in dismantling Iran's conventional military command structure, potentially leaving elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Basij, and other armed groups operating without centralized control. Such an outcome would create a deeply dangerous situation, recalling the aftermath of the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In both cases, the collapse of state institutions fueled prolonged instability, ultimately forcing Washington into a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan and a near-complete disengagement from Iraq after failing to achieve its strategic objectives. The region, particularly Iraq, paid an enormous price for what many viewed as America's military adventure.

The United States is unlikely to overthrow the Iranian regime without launching a full-scale ground invasion—an option whose enormous political and military costs are well understood in Washington. Consequently, this second phase of the conflict is unlikely to bring about regime change. It may, however, leave the Iranian leadership more deeply wounded and considerably more determined to seek revenge against neighboring states.

The second danger lies in the possibility that U.S. coercive diplomacy could fail to impose its preferred terms through military force. Should that occur, negotiations would likely return to a revised version of a memorandum of understanding. Iran may eventually conclude that using the Strait of Hormuz as leverage has no viable future and that the international community will not tolerate disruptions to freedom of navigation. In exchange for accepting this reality and making additional compromises, Tehran could gradually regain access to its frozen assets while seeing international sanctions eased over time.

Iran's chances of emerging victorious in this confrontation appear no greater than the likelihood of its outright defeat or unconditional surrender. The more probable scenario, given current regional and international dynamics, is that the United States will continue degrading Iran's military capabilities in an effort to force further concessions.

However, should President Trump carry out his threats by dramatically expanding attacks against Iran's civilian infrastructure and oil facilities beyond the current level, Tehran's response is likely to become broader and far less predictable. Such retaliation could target Gulf states as well as the global economy. From the Iranian perspective, extensive attacks on civilian infrastructure would transform the conflict from a conventional military confrontation into a struggle for the regime's survival. Under those circumstances, Tehran would be expected to employ every instrument at its disposal, acting according to a logic that accepts self-inflicted damage if it also imposes substantial costs on its adversaries.

Originally published in Al Masry Al Youm.