Why The Next Iran Nuclear Deal Must Toast To The JCPOA

Why The Next Iran Nuclear Deal Must Toast To The JCPOA

By Shravishtha Ajaykumar 

Associate Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy, and Technology at the Observer Research Foundation.

Held in New York City from late April to late May 2026, the 11th Review Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — 11th NPT RevCon — revealed increasing schisms in the international non-proliferation regime, amid the growing interconnection between geopolitical tensions and nuclear security. Among the most contentious issues discussed were the security of civilian nuclear facilities and the continuation of verification efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during armed conflict. Among the white papers submitted ahead of the RevCon discussions, Iran’s paper, entitled “Prohibition of Attacks on Peaceful Nuclear Facilities and Scientists,” sparked debate over how much protection existing international law actually affords nuclear infrastructure against military action. Although most delegations agreed that verification systems must continue functioning even in wartime, no consensus was reached.

The current conflict in Iran has exhibited a sequence in which escalations, sanctions, military threats, and diplomatic efforts have all been part of the larger process of non-proliferation worldwide. These incremental tensions came after the disbanding of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In 2015, the JCPOA was put in place to intensively supervise Iran’s nuclear programme in return for sanctions being lifted via multilateral verification. The government of Iran, on 14 July 2015, signed a deal with the European Union and six powers — China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and Germany — whereby those states would remove international economic sanctions against Iran and allow Iran to integrate into the international economy. Some measures included reducing the country’s supply of enriched uranium to about 300 kg and maintaining uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent (well below the weapons-grade threshold of 90 percent). The JCPOA was, thus, both a diplomatic and a technical arrangement, legitimised by UN Security Council Resolution 2231.^[1]

The verification function was carried out by the IAEA, ensuring compliance with the agreement through inspections, safeguards, and accounting mechanisms. The JCPOA was more a system of controlled compliance than a binding treaty. Its purpose was to minimise the risk of proliferation through transparency, regular monitoring and oversight, and rebuilding trust, rather than through the simple elimination of nuclear capacities. Together with the NPT, the JCPOA reinforced existing obligations. But for it to function, it required constant verification and the commitment of the involved countries.

In 2018, the United States withdrew from the accord, followed by Iran rekindling its nuclear capabilities to enrich uranium and restrict inspections. By 2025, the JCPOA framework had largely become obsolete. In July 2025, France, Germany, and the UK invoked the “snapback” mechanism under Resolution 2231, which allows any participant state of the JCPOA to reimpose all suspended United Nations sanctions on Iran upon notification of a breach of the deal. Iran, of course, disagreed with the invocation of the snapback mechanism, raising concerns about a possible withdrawal from the NPT and increased uranium enrichment. The snapback highlighted a major flaw in the JCPOA as a treaty: its susceptibility to unilateral undermining. The closure of the JCPOA in 2025 reinforced distrust in the regime, given Iran’s responses to the US withdrawal and the snapback mechanism.

Even though the treaty involved rigorous technical verification mechanisms, it was still prone to decisions made by certain states. As the level of cooperation declined and inspections became minimal, the international community lost sight of Iran’s nuclear programme. The loss of verification capability has emerged as one of the major technical issues standing against the success of any future agreement.

The 2026 Iran Conflict and Nuclear Security Risks

The 2026 Iran conflict reveals that current nuclear governance can be challenged not only by proliferation issues but also by the very nature of contemporary warfare. With the growing use of precision targeting, cyberattacks, and electronic warfare, it has become more difficult to verify nuclear commitments, even where there is no indication of an active nuclear programme at all. This has important implications for any new deal between Iran and the United States, since verification is now taking place against a backdrop of ongoing security challenges.

The Iran war has fed into contemporary discussions on nuclear proliferation and verification. With military attacks carried out against nuclear infrastructure, cyberattacks underway, and fewer inspectors permitted to enter the facilities, the IAEA could no longer effectively monitor these activities.

This has raised concerns regarding the protection of nuclear assets during wartime. The attacks on enrichment facilities and energy infrastructure, including nuclear power stations, revealed the vulnerability of these facilities in contemporary warfare. Beyond the direct damage to enrichment sites, the strikes also interfered with the functioning of power grids, transport, communications, and the monitoring of nuclear materials. This disruption to supporting infrastructure is significant because modern nuclear verification depends on much more than physical access to enrichment facilities. Since the IAEA relies on constant surveillance systems, secure communication, electronic seals, environmental sampling, and an unbroken chain of custody for accounting for nuclear materials, any disruption to electricity, communications, transport, or computer systems undermines verification efforts, even where an inspector is eventually able to access the facility. The conflict has highlighted the growing intersection between cyber warfare and nuclear governance. As a result of attacks on control systems, surveillance, and communications, it has become difficult to rely on monitoring data and remote verification systems.

Such trends point to a much larger problem currently facing the international non-proliferation system. The most recent conflicts — the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, and the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict — have shown the growing importance of precision strikes on critical infrastructure. Electricity grids, communication facilities, logistical centres, and other critical infrastructure have become military targets owing to their strategic importance. Such strikes pose new problems for verification mechanisms, since many of these facilities are also relied upon to monitor nuclear-related activities. As a result, any future non-proliferation treaty should account for the possibility that verification systems will not operate unhindered in the event of war.

Despite these concerns over monitoring an evasive country’s nuclear capabilities, IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has stated that there is no evidence that Iran is currently building a nuclear weapon; however, the IAEA is preparing to resume its verification programme.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi has repeatedly emphasised that any future agreement will ultimately depend not on political declarations but on the restoration of comprehensive verification.Following the recent US-Iran understandings, he has stressed that inspectors must regain access to nuclear facilities, re-establish continuity of knowledge over Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles, and restore confidence in monitoring systems before the international community can accurately assess Iran’s nuclear programme. These technical challenges illustrate that verification itself has become one of the principal diplomatic issues in negotiations over any future agreement.

What Beyond the JCPOA?

Despite all its failures and the ongoing erosion of trust, the JCPOA remains an example of a highly developed model of verification diplomacy in the context of nuclear agreements. It succeeded because of the combination of binding commitments, verification, and institutional oversight. Its value became even more apparent following its termination and the subsequent escalation of geopolitical conflict.

However, any successor arrangement is unlikely to fully replicate the JCPOA. Iran’s nuclear programme has advanced considerably since 2015, while the regional security environment has become substantially more complex. Several aspects would need to be strengthened to make any post-conflict, JCPOA-type framework more effective.

First, any new structure must ensure that verification continues even if one participating party withdraws from its commitments, since the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 undermined the multilateral framework and eroded trust in the safeguards regime.

Second, a new system would have to set out clear enforcement procedures and jurisdiction, neither of which is currently well defined, particularly in the event of conflict. Although UNSC Resolution 2231 laid out a process for reimposing sanctions, the snapback episode exposed significant coordination problems.

Third, any such accord must ensure it is not a unilaterally focused verification system. While Iran is bound to open itself to inspections and provide for consistent monitoring and accounting of its nuclear material, the infrastructure needed for that process remains comparatively unprotected against threats. With states retaining considerable freedom to carry out precision strikes and cyberattacks on such facilities, verification may become ineffective regardless of whether Iran itself complies.

Finally, any future system must also address technological vulnerabilities. Greater use of remote monitoring, data protection technology, and fail-safes could increase confidence in the proper functioning of safeguards under challenging conditions. This would also require the IAEA to enhance its verification methods to include space-based surveillance and tracking that does not depend solely on state cooperation.

More broadly, this means expanding verification beyond traditional inspections to include greater use of satellite imagery, secure digital monitoring, cyber-resilient communications, protected data storage, and redundant monitoring systems capable of operating during periods of conflict. Rather than replacing physical inspections, these technologies could strengthen the resilience of verification mechanisms when access becomes temporarily impossible.

The key lesson from the JCPOA is that verification must be treated as a primary priority in nuclear non-proliferation. Without a verification mechanism in place, treaties depend on political will alone rather than on evidence — and as the Iran conflict has shown, political will and geopolitical stability are far from guaranteed. Future verification systems must be updated to reflect the realities of modern conflict, in which cyber intrusions and constrained physical access are accounted for.

Conclusion

It can be argued that the JCPOA was one of the most, if not the most, significant successes in multilateral diplomacy on nuclear issues, despite the Trump administration’s distaste for the treaty. Following its collapse and the escalation of tensions in 2026, it became clear that agreements reliant solely on political cooperation are insufficient without adequate verification mechanisms in place.

The collapse of the JCPOA also revealed novel obstacles to nuclear non-proliferation governance. Alongside preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear powers must now also consider their security in the event of conflict and cyberattacks, and the protection of nuclear infrastructure more broadly. The discussions at the 2026 NPT Review Conference underscored the need for the non-proliferation regime to go beyond legal undertakings and maintain integrity amid geopolitical upheaval. The future of any non-proliferation deal, particularly one concerning Iran, must both resolve underlying problems diplomatically and provide for a legally robust, resilient verification arrangement.

This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.