Libya Amid Interlocking Crises... Awaiting the "Train of Settlement"

The interlocking crises in Libya are, in part, rooted in a series of structural distortions embedded within the country's political process. Their repercussions have manifested themselves in several ways, including the expansion of influence through force, attempts to attain power on a regional basis, and efforts to exploit oil resources and their revenues by any means possible.

The recent disruption of the military track, coupled with prolonged nationwide blackouts, and the public frustration that erupted in the capital following widespread power outages, ignited a wave of anger that points to an imminent danger. Perhaps the clearest indication was that many Libyans appeared to have overcome the barrier of fear, prompting protesters to block the entrance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with earth barricades and storm the Mellitah Oil and Gas Company.

The crisis that drove Libyans into the streets and public squares of Tripoli, where they set fires, blocked roads, and stormed key institutions, was not merely a reaction to electricity cuts. Rather, it exposed the cumulative pressures endured by citizens over the past years as they continued waiting for a political solution that has yet to materialize.

Libyan politicians and officials argue that the slow pace—and at times contradictory nature—of both domestic and international political initiatives, combined with the authorities' failure to manage the electricity crisis, has deepened public despair and opened the door to the emergence of so-called "virtual governments." They are calling for urgent action to rescue Libya from what they describe as an endless cycle of waiting.

Apart from a notable breakthrough in the military track between eastern and western Libya—brokered under U.S. auspices—which resulted in unprecedented rapprochement and joint military exercises involving previously divided forces, the political process remains stalled. Many observers believe it has effectively become hostage to the country's political elites, particularly the House of Representatives and the High Council of State.

Meanwhile, efforts to resolve Libya's political crisis are currently divided between U.S. diplomatic initiatives led by Massad Boulos, Senior Adviser to President Donald Trump for Arab and African Affairs, and mediation efforts undertaken by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

Seeking Common Ground

Fawzi Abdel Aal, Libya's former Interior Minister under the government of the National Transitional Council, believes that all initiatives aimed at resolving the political crisis should be approached by the rival parties in an effort to identify common ground.

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Aal argued that "under any circumstances, no meaningful progress will be achieved unless all parties are willing to make painful concessions."

To date, the proposed U.S. initiative on Libya has produced no tangible political breakthrough beyond a series of confidential meetings held in Arab and European capitals and consultations exploring possible solutions. It has also faced rejection from several political actors in western Libya.

Abdel Aal, who currently heads the National Authority for Cybersecurity and Digital Sovereignty under the Government of National Unity in Tripoli, attributes the failure of existing initiatives primarily to "a profound crisis of confidence among the parties and insufficient efforts to bridge that gap."

He further argues that international intervention may have widened divisions between the rival factions rather than helping to narrow them.

Where Is the United Nations?

Tripoli has grown accustomed to waves of protests that usually subside after several days of demands calling for the resignation of the Government of National Unity and its Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. Yet each protest leaves behind the same unanswered question: What comes next? And where does the United Nations fit into the equation?

Khaled Al-Ghweil, adviser on foreign affairs to the Union of Libyan Tribes, attributes most of Libya's recurring setbacks to foreign intervention in support of rival domestic factions.

He believes that the keys to a political settlement ultimately lie in Libyan hands alone, arguing that external intervention has done little more than deepen the country's divisions through international competition to support opposing actors, amounting to what he describes as blatant interference in Libya's internal affairs.

For her part, Hanna Tetteh, the UN Special Representative for Libya, has expressed hope that the outcomes of the Structured Dialogue process can be translated into practical measures on the ground, thereby accelerating the long-delayed presidential and parliamentary elections.

According to Tetteh, tangible progress has been achieved in the UN-sponsored Road Map.

Following a series of meetings held outside Libya by the "4+4" committee, which had nearly overcome disagreements over selecting a candidate to chair the High National Elections Commission under the UN roadmap, the issue was postponed until the first week of August.

The UN mission subsequently announced that committee members had adopted a new mechanism for reaching consensus on a candidate after implementation of the previously agreed mechanism had stalled.

Nevertheless, Al-Ghweil believes that the UN mission itself has contributed to exacerbating the crisis by remaining silent regarding what he describes as foreign interference in Libya's domestic affairs.

He added, "The House of Representatives and the High Council of State must unify their ranks alongside Libya's broader political and social forces to bring this division to an end, establish a unified government, and set a clear timetable for elections. Ultimately, the solution can only come through the will of the Libyan people themselves."

Meanwhile, U.S. diplomacy continues efforts to revive Libya's stalled political process through initiatives led by Massad Boulos with the support of Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Senior U.S. officials have also become directly involved. Members of Congress recently met Saddam Haftar and Khaled Haftar in Benghazi, while also holding talks in Tripoli with Lieutenant General Abdul Salam Al-Zoubi, Deputy Minister of Defense.

Entering Through the Military Door

Abdel Aal views the recent momentum surrounding Libya's political crisis as a potential opportunity to unlock the broader deadlock. "The Libyan file has become far more prominent on the international agenda than it was before," he said. "This momentum should be exploited to formulate a roadmap and establish a bridgehead toward conditions that would allow practical political solutions to emerge."

He cautioned, however, against allowing this renewed international attention to be diverted into yet another arena of confrontation or used to inflame existing tensions. "It is therefore essential," he argued, "that Libya's political forces and national elites demonstrate a high degree of political awareness and place the supreme interests of the Libyan people above all other considerations."

As for Massad Boulos, his approach to Libya's highly complex political landscape begins through the military establishment. The underlying assumption is that if the armed forces can be unified and the country's political and economic divisions reduced, this could pave the way for reunifying state institutions and building consensus around a credible nationwide electoral process.

Nevertheless, the U.S. initiative continues to operate within a zone of strategic ambiguity. So far, it has failed to produce a clearly defined roadmap, leaving prospects for a comprehensive political settlement postponed indefinitely.

Fears of an Elite Bargain

Growing opposition to the U.S. initiative in western Libya stems largely from concerns that it could produce what many describe as an "elite bargain" between Libya's existing centers of power—one that would consolidate the current distribution of influence and authority at the expense of democratic and institutional change.

A former security official in western Libya, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, argued that conflicting calculations among the country's political actors have further complicated the crisis.

"It has become apparent that each actor is pursuing a different trajectory, particularly following discussions of the U.S. initiative," he said. "The alignment that once brought together Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, Mohamed Al-Menfi, and Mohamed Takala has fractured, with the latter two now aligning themselves with House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh."

He concluded that "private political agendas remain the principal driving force behind Libya's political class."

The U.S. Plan and the Politics of Easy Solutions

According to circulating reports, the proposed U.S. plan envisions Abdul Hamid Dbeibah remaining as Prime Minister while Saddam Haftar assumes the presidency of the Presidential Council, replacing Mohamed Al-Menfi.

At the same time, numerous international actors continue to monitor developments in Libya amid the rapidly evolving pragmatic relationship between Turkey and the General Command in eastern Libya. The two sides appear to have moved beyond years of historical rivalry toward direct security and economic understandings.

Within this emerging dynamic, Saddam Haftar has increasingly become a pivotal interlocutor, leading high-level channels of communication that have reportedly produced understandings concerning reconstruction efforts and the protection of Turkish economic interests in eastern and southern Libya.

These developments reflect a mutual desire to redraw the map of regional influence, diversify strategic partnerships, and establish a new balance that insulates the security and economic sectors from the country's persistent political divisions.

Against this backdrop, Libya's fragmented political landscape has produced what some observers describe as a "virtual government"—a striking illustration of the country's political fragmentation and institutional fluidity.

According to political analysts, this development carries two significant implications. On the one hand, it reflects widespread public and political frustration with the prolonged deadlock and the paralysis perpetuated by Libya's traditional political actors, prompting new groups to seek a foothold in anticipation of future negotiations.

On the other hand, it risks transforming the formation of executive authority into a form of "political improvisation" that could undermine international efforts to organize a comprehensive settlement and further fragment national legitimacy rather than restore it.

Amid this slow-moving and uncertain environment, Libya remains suspended in anticipation of a long-awaited political settlement. Diplomatic activity continues behind closed doors, while realities on the ground deepen the erosion of both time and political legitimacy.

Money, Weapons, and Influence: The Trilogy That Has Exhausted Libya

Since the fall of the late President Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011, Libya's crisis has evolved far beyond a political contest among rival factions competing for power. It has become a closed cycle sustained by a highly complex trilogy that has drained the country's resources and undermined its prospects for stability: money, weapons, and influence.

This trilogy has fundamentally reshaped Libya's political and economic landscape, depleted its national capabilities, and made the restoration of a functioning state contingent upon an intricate equation in which domestic interests intersect with regional and international rivalries.

Oil Wealth: From National Asset to Source of Conflict

The first pillar of this trilogy is the economy. In a country whose public finances depend almost entirely on oil exports, hydrocarbon wealth has gradually shifted from being an engine of development to becoming one of the principal drivers of conflict.

The struggle has not been limited to controlling crude oil production and exports. It has also extended to disputes over the distribution of oil revenues, while large-scale oil smuggling operations—both domestically and internationally—have further complicated the picture.

This environment has fostered the emergence of a parallel financial system that has weakened the efficiency of economic governance and disrupted monetary policy. The consequences have been felt directly by ordinary Libyans through deteriorating public services, declining purchasing power, and increasing economic hardship. Ironically, the country's greatest source of wealth has itself become a source of economic strain.

The Proliferation of Weapons

The second pillar is the widespread availability of weapons and the continued existence of numerous armed formations operating outside unified state institutions.

This fragmented security landscape has become one of the principal obstacles to building a unified national security architecture capable of exercising the state's exclusive monopoly over the legitimate use of force.

Weapons are therefore no longer merely instruments of defense or public security. They have become central components of Libya's political equation.

The proliferation of militias and competing centers of military power has weakened the authority of the state, allowing armed actors to impose political conditions or obstruct arrangements that conflict with their interests. Military strength has effectively become a means of political leverage.

Influence: Linking Wealth and Force

The third pillar is the struggle for influence, both internally and externally.

Domestically, this competition is reflected in political and geographical power-sharing arrangements. Externally, it is driven by the intersecting interests of regional and international powers seeking to shape Libya's future.

This interaction has transformed Libya into an arena where local ambitions and international agendas continuously intersect.

Influence functions as the connecting link between wealth and military power. Actors who control financial resources or armed capabilities naturally seek to expand their influence within state institutions, as well as across the country's social and economic spheres and its regional and international relationships.

In turn, influence provides greater access to financial resources and additional instruments of power, creating a self-reinforcing cycle in which each element continuously strengthens the others.

The State Under Pressure

The impact of this trilogy has not been confined to Libya's political and military elites. It has also penetrated the state's institutions themselves.

Declining institutional independence, overlapping interests, and the multiplication of competing decision-making centers have significantly weakened the state's ability to perform its basic functions. As a result, many Libyans have lost confidence in the possibility of achieving lasting political solutions.

These structural weaknesses have also taken a heavy toll on the national economy, public services, and living standards in a country endowed with considerable natural and human resources but still unable to translate them into stability and sustainable development.

Ultimately, this environment has reinforced political paralysis. Each competing actor seeks to preserve the gains accumulated over the years while obstructing any political process that might redistribute power or diminish the influence it has acquired.

The result is a self-perpetuating cycle in which wealth finances power, power secures influence, and influence, in turn, safeguards access to wealth and coercive capabilities. Breaking this cycle remains one of the greatest challenges confronting any future political settlement in Libya.