Lebanon Between the State and Multiple Loyalties: The Roots of the Crisis and the Limits of the Consociational Model

Lebanon’s current crisis is rooted, in significant part, in a question that predates its successive political and security crises: the nature of the political compact upon which the Lebanese state was established, and the extent to which that compact has been able to accommodate the country’s social and political diversity within a single state framework. Whenever Lebanon enters a new phase of conflict, foundational questions that were never fully resolved return to the forefront: What is the ultimate political authority in Lebanon? Does legitimate decision-making derive exclusively from state institutions, or does it intersect with religious, sectarian, and regional affiliations that extend beyond national borders?

These questions have acquired renewed significance amid the continuing debate over Lebanon’s policy of “dissociation” or “disassociation” from regional conflicts, the state’s authority over decisions of war and peace, and the limits of Lebanese political actors’ ties to regional environments beyond the state. A significant part of the contemporary political debate concerns the extent to which different actors have adhered to the understandings underpinning Lebanon’s political framework. Another perspective, however, holds that the disagreement goes beyond compliance with particular commitments and instead concerns competing conceptions of Lebanon itself, its regional role, and its relationship with its Arab surroundings.

The crisis therefore cannot easily be reduced to a binary distinction between one side being “right” and the other “wrong.” Lebanon’s different communities and political forces draw upon competing historical and political narratives, each offering its own interpretation of the country’s founding, the meaning of sovereignty, and Lebanon’s relations with its regional environment. Yet these narratives reveal a deeper question concerning the source of political legitimacy: Is priority to be given to the state as the institutional framework within which citizenship is exercised, or to communal affiliations rooted in religion, sect, ethnicity, or historical ties?

The Founding of the State and the Problem of the Political Compact

Understanding this dilemma requires a return to the period preceding the establishment of Greater Lebanon in 1920. The modern Lebanese state emerged within a highly complex regional and international context, amid competing conceptions regarding the borders of the state, its identity, and its relationship with its surroundings. The expansion of the borders of the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon to include the Beqaa Valley, Akkar, and coastal cities was a central component of the project that eventually resulted in the creation of Greater Lebanon under the French Mandate.

The project did not enjoy domestic consensus from the outset. Large segments of the Christian political elite viewed it as a framework capable of establishing a Lebanese political entity with broader geographic and economic foundations than those of the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon. Other segments of the Muslim political elite opposed this trajectory, particularly in areas that had historically maintained political, economic, and social links with the broader Syrian sphere.

This does not mean that positions were uniform within any particular sectarian community. Lebanese society, like most complex societies, witnessed considerable internal disagreement over the country’s future. The positions of political elites, parties, and individuals also evolved over time in response to changing regional and international circumstances and shifts in the domestic balance of power. Nevertheless, the existence of these early divisions remains important for understanding why the question of Lebanese national identity became closely intertwined from the outset with the question of Lebanon’s relationship with Syria and the wider Arab world.

The French Mandate further entrenched this complexity. While the establishment of Greater Lebanon represented, for its supporters, the creation of a political entity with its own distinct identity, for other segments of society the redrawing of borders was associated with the intervention of an external power in determining political and territorial arrangements. Two broad historical narratives consequently emerged: one viewed the establishment of Lebanon as a process of constructing an independent political state, while the other interpreted the redrawing of borders as part of a wider process of fragmenting the broader Syrian and Arab political space.

From Competing Narratives to a Crisis of Political Authority

The significance of this historical background lies in its ability to explain the persistence of disagreements over the meaning of sovereignty. If the state constitutes the ultimate political authority, its constitutional institutions should have the final say over sovereign matters, particularly foreign policy, defense, and decisions concerning war and peace. If political communities, however, continue to maintain sources of authority that transcend the state, national decision-making becomes fragmented, and sovereignty shifts from being an institutional principle to a field of negotiation among domestic and external actors.

Over the past century, Lebanon has experienced several turning points that reproduced this dilemma in different forms. The political understandings that contributed to independence in 1943 sought to establish a formula capable of accommodating sectarian pluralism through power-sharing and political balance. Yet these arrangements did not fully resolve disagreements over Lebanon’s position within the Arab world or the nature of its relations with regional powers.

Later, the rise of Arab nationalism and Nasserism, followed by the Palestinian question, reactivated internal Lebanese divisions over foreign policy and security. As armed actors operating outside formal state institutions gained greater prominence, sovereignty became a central issue in Lebanon’s political conflict, eventually contributing to the civil war and to the political and security arrangements that followed it.

This reveals one of the central paradoxes of the Lebanese experience: a political formula designed to manage pluralism through sectarian power-sharing provided an important mechanism for maintaining political equilibrium, but did not necessarily produce a lasting consensus over the meaning of the state or its role in the regional environment.

The Taif Agreement and the Test of State Authority

The Taif Agreement represented a major turning point in reorganizing Lebanon’s political system and ending the civil war. It also rebalanced certain powers among the institutions of the state and the country’s political communities. Yet the post-Taif period revealed the limits of translating a constitutional settlement into a complete state monopoly over sovereign decision-making.

This dilemma became particularly visible with the continued existence of arms outside the formal military structure, and subsequently with the rise of Hezbollah as both a political and military actor. The significance of this situation extends beyond Hezbollah itself. It concerns the broader relationship between resistance and the state, between national commitments and regional affiliations, and over which authority should have the final say regarding the use of force inside and outside the country.

The issue acquired an additional regional dimension with Hezbollah’s involvement in regional conflicts, particularly the Syrian war, followed by continuing tensions along the Lebanese-Israeli border. Hezbollah and its supporters have framed its armed capacity in terms of resistance and deterrence against Israel. Its political opponents, by contrast, argue that the continued existence of an armed force outside the state weakens national sovereignty and increases Lebanon’s exposure to regional agendas that are not necessarily subject to Lebanese constitutional institutions.

The central issue, therefore, is not simply which of these narratives should prevail. Rather, it is that the continued existence of multiple military and security authorities reflects an unresolved dispute over the nature of the state itself.

From Sectarian Pluralism to Multiple Centers of Decision-Making

Historically, Lebanon’s political system has treated sectarian pluralism as a political reality to be managed through power-sharing. The problem emerges when pluralism develops from a diversity of interests and political representation into a multiplicity of sources of sovereign decision-making.

Differences among political parties and communities over economic policy, reform, or the distribution of resources can be accommodated within a democratic system through institutions, elections, and political compromise. When disagreement extends, however, to questions of war and peace, foreign policy, and the possession of armed force, it touches the core of statehood.

This is one of the most important dimensions of Lebanon’s current crisis. The problem is not simply that Lebanese political actors disagree over specific policies; it is that competing conceptions exist regarding the nature of the state itself and the limits of its sovereignty. As long as these conceptions remain unresolved within a political and constitutional framework capable of accommodating them, the possibility of recurring crises will remain.

The Regional Dimension and the Crisis of National Decision-Making

Lebanon’s predicament cannot be understood independently of its regional environment. Since its establishment, Lebanon has been located in a region where multiple political, nationalist, sectarian, and regional projects intersect. Its geographic position and complex social composition have made it particularly vulnerable to surrounding conflicts.

At different stages, weaknesses within the state increased the ability of external actors to influence Lebanese politics through political, financial, military, and diplomatic support, as well as through relationships with domestic actors. Over time, some Lebanese political forces developed regional affiliations extending beyond conventional diplomatic relations, making Lebanese foreign policy itself an arena of internal political contestation.

This context explains the growing prominence of the concept of “disassociation” or “dissociation” from regional conflicts in Lebanese political discourse. In principle, the policy seeks to shield Lebanon from direct involvement in regional conflicts. Its practical application, however, depends on the existence of domestic agreement over who holds authority over foreign policy and on the state’s capacity to enforce that agreement.

The debate over dissociation is therefore not merely a disagreement over Lebanon’s position toward a particular regional crisis. It reflects a broader question concerning the independence of Lebanese decision-making.

Does the Problem Lie in the System or in Its Implementation?

Lebanon’s crisis cannot easily be attributed to a single factor. The sectarian political system, despite the questions it raises regarding citizenship and political equality, does not operate in isolation. It has interacted with institutional weakness, regional and international intervention, successive wars, economic crises, and the incomplete development of stable modern state institutions.

The Lebanese experience also demonstrates that political settlements can prevent escalation for certain periods without necessarily resolving structural disagreements. If they are not accompanied by the development of institutions capable of managing pluralism within a shared framework, political settlements may postpone conflict rather than resolve it.

The more fundamental question, therefore, is not simply whether Lebanon chose the right or wrong political model at the time of its establishment. It is whether Lebanon today can redefine its political compact around a clearer understanding of the relationship between citizen, sect, and state, and between the Lebanese state and its regional environment.

Toward a Reconsideration of the National Compact

The recurrence of Lebanon’s crises demonstrates that temporary political settlements, however necessary, cannot by themselves address a structural crisis concerning the definition and limits of state authority. Any settlement that fails to clarify the issue of sovereign authority risks postponing rather than resolving the underlying conflict.

This suggests the need to reconsider Lebanon’s national compact from a perspective that goes beyond the redistribution of parliamentary seats and institutional powers among sectarian communities. At the theoretical and political levels, the challenge is to establish a set of principles that do not become subject to renegotiation during every crisis: the state’s monopoly over armed force, the independence of foreign policy, adherence to constitutional institutions, and equality of citizenship, while preserving the social and cultural pluralism that remains a defining feature of Lebanese society.

Such a transformation cannot be achieved through a rapid decision to abolish sectarian political arrangements, nor through the immediate dismantling of historical balances. The issue is considerably more complex and requires a gradual political and constitutional process that takes into account the concerns of Lebanon’s different communities and prevents political transition itself from becoming a source of renewed conflict.

Conclusion

Lebanon’s experience demonstrates that the roots of its current crisis extend back to the very formation of the modern state, when the construction of the Lebanese entity became intertwined with questions concerning its relationship with Syria and the wider Arab world. These questions subsequently intersected with successive regional and international conflicts. The fundamental problem was not disagreement among Lebanese communities in itself, since disagreement is a normal feature of pluralistic societies, but the state’s incomplete success in transforming such differences into institutional political competition within a framework in which sovereign authority is clearly defined.

In this sense, Lebanon’s central challenge is not merely how to manage a particular political or security crisis, but how to rebuild a national consensus around the authority of the state. As long as the state remains one among several competing political and security reference points, crises will remain capable of recurring regardless of changing alliances, political actors, or regional circumstances.

The question facing Lebanon today is therefore not simply how to avoid another crisis, but how to develop a political framework in which disagreement among its communities becomes part of democratic competition rather than a source of multiple centers of authority and sovereignty. Ultimately, Lebanon’s stability depends on its ability to move from managing balances among communities toward building institutions capable of managing pluralism within a single state, where sovereign decisions are grounded in constitutional institutions and the political will of its citizens.