The only thing Saudi Arabia and Iran have in common is China. Beijing is the largest buyer of oil from both countries, and it is also being affected by the war through supply disruptions and their broader economic repercussions. Gasoline prices have risen by roughly one-third, while Chinese exports to Arab markets have declined. Even so, China’s economy continues to grow.

China is the country with the greatest stake in the security of energy supplies and maritime navigation in the Middle East, because it is the region’s principal oil importer. The United States, by contrast, no longer depends on Gulf oil to the same extent, having become the world’s largest oil producer and exporter. Yet despite the enormous scale of its interests in the region, Beijing pursues a policy that is fundamentally different from Washington’s—so different that it can sometimes be difficult for us to understand.

America’s policy is well known. Particularly since Britain’s withdrawal from “East of Suez,” Washington’s approach has been closely aligned with its interests: safeguarding the flow of energy and containing communist expansion. President Richard Nixon adopted a policy of supporting Iran and Saudi Arabia as regional pillars. This was followed by the well-known Carter Doctrine, under which the United States committed itself to using military force to protect the Gulf.

The Middle East is important to China, but Beijing has not yet acted as a guarantor of its interests there. China possesses the world’s largest fleet of commercial vessels, yet its ships have been waiting outside the Strait of Hormuz. It also maintains a naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, close to areas where Yemen’s Houthi militias operate. Despite attacks in the region, Chinese forces have refrained from directly confronting the Houthis, while Chinese tankers have remained waiting in the open sea.

The most likely explanation is that Chinese policymakers prefer not to become directly involved in the US-Iran conflict. They may also see some advantage in weakening the Trump administration by refraining from intervening against Iran. Tehran has now decided to allow some Chinese vessels to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, but this accommodation came rather late—after the Americans opened a maritime corridor through Omani waters that is less vulnerable to Iranian attacks.

It was this alternative maritime route that prompted the Iranians to travel to Baghdad last week and persuade the relevant parties that their oil tankers would be exempted from attacks and should use the Iranian maritime corridor. By then, however, most tankers had already abandoned the Iranian route and shifted to the Omani corridor.

The war may end now, or it may continue for another year. But over the longer term, China is likely to follow the strategy previously pursued by other great powers, notably Britain and the United States, to defend their interests: building a larger naval fleet, establishing more military bases, concluding additional defence agreements, and adopting a more explicitly aligned foreign policy.

But not yet.

For the time being, China is content to coexist with American predominance, first because it benefits from the security that ensures the continued flow of oil, and second because it has other geopolitical priorities that are geographically distant from the Middle East—Taiwan, the South and East China Seas, and ultimately the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This was why former US President Barack Obama described China as a “free rider”: a country benefiting from American protection of global maritime routes without bearing the full costs of providing that security.

China’s policy is somewhat unfamiliar to us. Historically, we have tended to understand the international system through the logic of competing blocs and alignments: the French or the British, the Axis or the Allies, the Soviet Union or the United States. China, however, is rising rapidly as a global power, yet it has not reached the stage at which it is compelled to impose clear-cut strategic alignments on other countries—or to make a definitive choice between competing camps.

That does not mean Beijing is a country without alliances or strategic positions. It certainly has adversaries in its immediate geopolitical neighbourhood.

In the Middle East and Africa, however, Beijing is effectively a “friend to everyone.” This makes its policy relatively easy to engage with, while at the same time making it difficult to fully understand. China can appear deeply contradictory: it is the largest buyer from the warring Gulf states, while also being the largest trading partner of both Saudi Arabia and Iran. China is also Israel’s second-largest trading partner, while simultaneously supporting the Palestinian cause.

The tedious Chinese neutrality we are witnessing today is likely to diminish as Beijing’s interests expand and, at times, come into conflict with one another. The war involving Iran has provided a major test of this policy. So far, China has not been forced to abandon its declared neutrality, but it may do so if the conflict expands and becomes prolonged.

This does not mean that China is not quietly and selectively assisting Iran today, without openly challenging the American sanctions regime. Beijing wants to see Trump defeated, but at the same time it understands that the Iranian regime, by its very nature, generates instability and disorder that can ultimately harm Chinese interests.

Iran, for its part, regards China as its only true ally and is seeking its support, while viewing Russia as a temporary transactional friend because of longstanding differences and inherited disputes.

Meanwhile, the Arab states—particularly the Gulf countries—have built substantial relationships based on mutual interests with China. They are seeking to win Beijing over, or at least to ensure that it remains neutral, and they have achieved some success in doing so.

China repeatedly insists that it “does not want to become another America”—that is, another hegemonic power. Yet there is enough evidence to suggest that the “Dragon Empire” is coming. China has already established its first overseas military base in our region, in Djibouti, south of the Red Sea. It has also deployed warships near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and previously contributed to international efforts to combat Somali piracy.

If the United States eventually withdraws from the region, China may well be compelled to fill the resulting vacuum.