A Unified Syria Challenges Israel’s Calculations: Is Tel Aviv’s Bet on Fragmentation Losing Ground?

The developments unfolding in Syria are no longer merely internal changes that can be separated from the broader regional struggle. They are increasingly forcing regional and international powers to reassess policies that have shaped their approach since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Among these actors, Israel appears to be facing a genuine strategic test, as some of the pillars underpinning its approach to the new Syrian reality are beginning to lose their effectiveness.

Recent developments—notably the process of integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), or “QSD,” into Syrian state institutions; the decline of the Druze separatist project in Suwayda; growing U.S. engagement with Damascus; and the flow of investment into Syria—collectively point toward a trajectory that runs counter to the idea of dividing the country into competing spheres of influence.

This presents Israel with a strategic paradox. What Tel Aviv previously regarded as an opportunity to weaken the Syrian state and prevent the restoration of centralized authority may gradually become a source of strategic concern. The more Damascus restores control over its territory and institutions, the less valuable internal divisions become as a tool for managing Israel’s surrounding security environment.

From Managing Fragmentation to Fearing the Restoration of the State

Following the fall of Assad’s regime, Israel viewed the Syrian landscape as an opportunity to reshape the strategic environment around it. In this assessment, minorities were not merely social communities requiring protection; they also became potential political instruments capable of preventing the emergence of a centralized Syrian state and obstructing the restoration of its authority across the country.

The Kurds and the Druze assumed particular importance within these calculations. The existence of an armed Kurdish force in the north and a Druze community possessing distinctive political and security characteristics in the south could facilitate the emergence of independent or semi-independent centers of power, making the process of rebuilding the Syrian state considerably more difficult.

Against this backdrop, cooperation between Israel and certain Kurdish and Druze actors was not simply a limited security matter. It was linked to a broader approach based on managing Syria’s internal balance of power in a way that would prevent the restoration of centralized state authority across the country.

That approach, however, is now facing a difficult test.

If the Damascus–SDF integration process ultimately leads to the unification of Syria’s military and security institutions, one of the most important cards that could have been used to sustain Syrian fragmentation will lose much of its value. If this is accompanied by the decline of the project to turn Suwayda into an autonomous sphere of influence, Israel’s room for maneuver inside Syria will narrow further.

The SDF and the Hardest Test for Israel’s Strategy

The significance of the Damascus–SDF agreement extends beyond the relationship between the central government and Kurdish forces. The real test is whether the agreement will lead to the reintegration of the Kurdish military force into the Syrian state, effectively ending the possibility of northeastern Syria becoming a separate political and security entity.

This is precisely what gives the agreement strategic significance for Israel.

The existence of a relatively autonomous and heavily armed Kurdish entity provided Israel, from its perspective, with a means of exerting pressure on Damascus and preventing the Syrian state from fully restoring its monopoly over force. Integrating the SDF into state institutions, by contrast, would mean that one of the most difficult issues obstructing Syrian reunification for years could enter a process of political settlement.

That is why U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack’s description of the agreement as a “historic step” should not be viewed merely as diplomatic rhetoric. It also reflects an emerging American preference for supporting a unified Syria rather than consolidating separate spheres of influence.

This presents Israel with a strategic problem: the more Syrian unity becomes an American and regional objective, the more Israel’s bet on fragmentation conflicts with the broader direction of the emerging settlement.

Suwayda: The Card Facing an Identity Test

As the Kurdish card loses some of its strategic weight, Suwayda appears increasingly important in Israel’s calculations. Yet this card is itself facing growing complications.

The discourse surrounding the protection of the Druze can easily shift from a security narrative into a political project if it becomes associated with efforts to separate Suwayda from its Syrian environment or redefine the identity of its population on a basis that transcends its national affiliation.

The recent statements by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who spoke of a special relationship between the Druze and Israel, gave this approach an explicit political dimension. The problem for such a project, however, lies not only in Damascus’s position or that of Arab states, but also in its ability to gain acceptance within the Druze community itself.

The conference held in the village of Ein Qiniyye in the northern Golan, which brought together activists who rejected al-Hijri’s statements, indicates that any attempt to portray a single position as representative of the entire Druze community faces significant internal divisions.

This is strategically important because any Israeli policy based on treating minorities as politically homogeneous units becomes more fragile when internal currents emerge that reject attempts to redefine their political identity according to Tel Aviv’s preferred narrative.

From Protecting Minorities to Politically Instrumentalizing Them

The deeper problem with the Israeli approach does not lie in engaging with minorities per se, but in transforming questions of protection and security into tools for reshaping Syria’s political map.

Protecting minorities can be a legitimate objective in any political transition. But exploiting sectarian fears to consolidate separate spheres of influence produces an entirely different outcome: prolonging fragmentation rather than addressing the roots of the crisis.

The experience of recent years has demonstrated that sectarianism does not necessarily produce stable political entities. In Syria specifically, deepening communal divisions can create an even more fragile security environment in the long term—one that could ultimately become a threat to Israel itself.

A weak Syrian state is therefore not necessarily the state most compatible with Israeli interests. The collapse of state institutions can facilitate the proliferation of armed groups, expand smuggling networks, create areas beyond effective state control, and open the door to competing regional and international actors.

In other words, there is a fundamental difference between weakening a centralized adversary and creating a permanent security vacuum along one’s borders.

Four Strategic Blows—and a Fifth on the Way

According to the reading advanced by Israeli analyst Zvi Bar’el, Israel is confronting a series of developments in Syria that undermine its previous calculations.

The first is the process of integrating the SDF, which weakens the prospect of partition.

The second is the erosion of the narrative portraying the new Syrian authorities as an inherently terrorist regime with which no engagement is possible, particularly as international attitudes toward Damascus have evolved.

The third is the declining effectiveness of the Suwayda card, amid the absence of broad Druze consensus around either separatism or alignment with Israel.

The fourth is the beginning of renewed economic activity and investment in Syria, suggesting that the country could gradually move from collapse toward institutional and economic reconstruction.

If these trends continue, Israel will face a new reality: Syria may not become an ally, but neither may it remain a fragmented state that can be influenced primarily through minorities and territories beyond central control.

The anticipated return of the U.S. diplomatic presence in Damascus would represent another significant indicator of this transformation.

The restoration of the American embassy would not necessarily mean the end of disagreements with Damascus, but it would signal a shift from isolation toward engagement. That alone would alter the environment in which Israel operates.

Ankara, Riyadh, and Doha: The Regional Environment Is Changing

This transformation cannot be understood without considering the regional context. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have different interests and perspectives regarding Syria, but they increasingly converge—albeit to varying degrees—on the importance of preventing the country’s fragmentation.

Turkey, in particular, has a direct interest in preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity along its border, while Arab states generally view the continued fragmentation of Syria as a persistent source of regional instability.

A new regional equation is therefore emerging in which partition does not appear to be the preferred option for most influential actors.

If these interests converge with an American position supportive of Syrian unity, Israel’s ability to impose an alternative vision will become increasingly constrained—particularly if Tel Aviv itself lacks a comprehensive political project for the post-conflict period.

Can Israel Move from Confrontation to Engagement?

This brings the debate to its most difficult question: What should Israel do if a unified Syria becomes the most likely trajectory?

Continuing to treat Damascus as an absolute enemy may preserve certain instruments of pressure, but it could simultaneously isolate Israel from the process of reshaping Syria.

Engaging with the Syrian authorities, even indirectly, would mean recognizing that Damascus has become an actor that cannot simply be bypassed.

This does not mean that Israel must turn Syria into an ally. The political and security gap between the two sides remains substantial. But shifting from a logic of “weakening the Syrian state” to one of “dealing with the Syrian state” may prove more consistent with the emerging reality.

Here, borders and security may matter more than political slogans. If Israel can secure guarantees regarding the security of the Golan Heights, prevent hostile armed activity, and ensure effective border control, a unified Syrian state may prove less dangerous than a fragmented Syria exposed to multiple competing forces.

The Israeli Dilemma: A Weak Enemy or a Stable State?

The equation confronting Israel today is more complicated than the simple binary of a “strong Syria” versus a “weak Syria.”

A strong Syrian state could possess the capacity to reclaim the Golan Heights and pursue the issue politically, which would not serve Israeli interests. But a collapsed Syrian state could become a source of uncontrolled threats, which would not serve Israel either.

Israel’s more realistic interest may therefore lie in a stable but non-hostile Syria, unified but constrained by security arrangements, and capable of controlling its territory without becoming a competing regional power.

That formula is fundamentally different from betting on fragmentation.

The End of the Fragmentation Illusion?

The problem is not that Israel has lost its ability to influence Syria. It still possesses significant military, intelligence, and political tools. Rather, the environment that once made a strategy based on exploiting internal divisions effective is changing rapidly.

The Kurds are entering a process of negotiation with Damascus, the Druze card is facing internal divisions, the United States is moving toward greater engagement with the Syrian authorities, and the major regional powers do not appear interested in partitioning Syria. At the same time, signs of economic recovery are gradually emerging.

None of this means that a unified Syria has become an accomplished fact. Integrating armed groups, rebuilding state institutions, resolving the relationship between the center and the periphery, and addressing sectarian tensions remain highly complex challenges. Any of these processes could unravel if political settlements fail.

But the direction of travel has changed.

The most important development in the Syrian landscape, therefore, is not simply that the SDF may enter state institutions, that Suwayda is facing a political crisis, or that Washington is re-engaging with Damascus. The deeper transformation is that the idea of a unified Syrian state is beginning to regain regional and international legitimacy at a time when the strategy of fragmenting Syria appears increasingly difficult to sustain.

If this trajectory continues, Israel will face the need to rethink its Syria policy.

The question may no longer be: How can Israel prevent Syria from becoming unified?

It may instead be: How can Israel deal with a unified Syria without allowing it to become a threat to Israeli security?

This is the central paradox. Israel, which has long benefited from the weakness of the Syrian state, may increasingly have to consider that a stable Syria could be less costly than a chaotic one, and that a state with which it can negotiate may be more manageable than a vacuum whose consequences cannot be predicted.

Ultimately, the Damascus–SDF agreement may prove to be more than a settlement between the central government and the Kurds. It could signal that the era of managing Syria through its internal divisions is approaching its limits, and that the next political struggle will not be over partitioning the country, but over the shape of the new Syrian state, its regional position, and the boundaries of external influence over it.

That is precisely the test Israel now faces: not whether it can obstruct Syria’s reunification, but whether it can adapt to a unified Syria if and when that trajectory becomes the preferred course of action for Washington and the region’s principal powers.