Will Trump End Up with Obama’s Deal?

If we set aside the noise and rhetoric surrounding the negotiations, their continued progress is itself a positive indicator that both sides are determined to reach an agreement. The cost of maintaining the current standoff is high, and any resumption of war would be devastating.

The Trump administration lacks the political support necessary for a major military campaign, while Iran continues to bleed economically as restrictions on its oil exports persist, despite official narratives claiming otherwise. Continued economic pressure will ultimately leave Tehran with only two choices: escalation or greater concessions.

But what if it turns out that Trump’s agreement ends up looking remarkably similar to Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal—an agreement focused solely on the nuclear issue in exchange for sanctions relief?

In my view, that remains the most likely outcome, although today’s circumstances differ significantly from those of a decade ago.

To understand the current moment, it is worth revisiting the context in which the Obama administration reached its agreement with Tehran. At the time, Bashar al-Assad’s regime was under immense pressure and appeared increasingly vulnerable as the Syrian uprising intensified. The Obama administration had signaled its willingness to punish Assad, including through measures such as a no-fly zone, following repeated chemical attacks that shocked international public opinion.

Closing Syrian airspace to regime aircraft—which were relentlessly bombing opposition-held areas—could have jeopardized one of Tehran’s most important regional allies.

In response, Iran effectively waved a red flag before Washington: its nuclear program. Tehran placed the issue on the negotiating table. Obama concluded that preventing a nuclear crisis was more important than pursuing Assad’s downfall and entered negotiations focused on a single issue—the nuclear file. The result was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the signature foreign-policy achievement of his presidency.

Historians and policymakers remain divided in their assessment of that agreement. On the one hand, it successfully reduced Iran’s enrichment activities for roughly a decade, while enriched uranium was transferred to Russia, effectively depriving Tehran of an immediate pathway toward a nuclear weapon.

On the other hand, Iran secured substantial gains. Assad survived. Most sanctions were lifted. Billions of dollars in frozen assets were returned. Tehran’s regional influence networks in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen faced little meaningful challenge. Meanwhile, its ballistic missile capabilities continued to develop.

Obama succeeded in delaying Iran’s military nuclear ambitions—but only temporarily.

His supporters defended the agreement against criticism from Gulf states, Israel, and Republicans in Washington, arguing that it would build trust with Tehran, empower more moderate elements within the Iranian system, and encourage greater regional and international integration. They suggested that Iran’s confrontational behavior was largely a product of isolation and insecurity.

Yet many countries in the region believed they understood their neighbor far better. From their perspective, the assumption that Tehran’s strategic behavior would fundamentally change bore little resemblance to reality.

For years, Donald Trump has criticized the Obama deal and continues to ridicule it. He has repeatedly promised that he would never sign a similar agreement. However, because military action has not produced a decisive outcome, his options remain limited.

Without a clear victory, both sides are ultimately driven back to the negotiating table.

Today, both the Trump administration and the Iranian leadership find themselves cornered and in need of some form of agreement. Although Trump has repeatedly insisted that he will not accept a single-issue nuclear deal, he may eventually find himself doing exactly that.

At least one important difference separates Trump from Obama. Trump has demonstrated a willingness to use military force, impose maximum economic pressure, and pursue a strategy of coercion that has produced tangible results. Obama operated under very different circumstances, enjoying unified Democratic support and broad European backing while preferring diplomatic engagement over confrontation.

Trump is reluctant to sign an agreement that resembles Obama’s because such an outcome could weaken him politically, damage his image, and diminish the legacy he hopes to leave behind.

For that reason, it is worth examining what the minimum acceptable outcome for the Trump camp might be.

The first requirement is nuclear: Iran would need either to halt or significantly limit uranium enrichment and transfer its stockpile of enriched uranium abroad. Any agreement would almost certainly require this.

The second concerns the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran would need to abandon any attempt to exert control over the waterway, a critical demand for Washington’s Gulf allies.

The third involves Israel. Any agreement would likely preserve Israel’s freedom to use force against Iran’s regional proxies without being constrained by broader diplomatic arrangements.

These three conditions represent the minimum threshold for an agreement that could be considered acceptable in Washington. Significantly, they are not far removed from the practical outcome of Obama’s 2015 deal. At that time, the Strait of Hormuz remained open, Israel retained broad freedom of action, and Iran accepted restrictions on its nuclear activities.

If a future agreement fails to secure these concessions from Tehran, some may conclude that Obama’s deal was, in fact, the better bargain.

Because neither side wishes to appear defeated, a more limited arrangement may emerge in the near term—one focused primarily on de-escalation rather than comprehensive resolution.

Recent reports suggest that Washington may be prepared to ease restrictions on Iranian ports gradually in exchange for Tehran removing threats and obstacles to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials have echoed similar accounts, while also insisting on access to approximately $24 billion in frozen funds held abroad from previous oil sales.

Such a de-escalation framework could reduce tensions, but it might also prolong negotiations by easing the economic pressure currently weighing on Iran. Yet the Trump administration cannot truly bring the conflict to a close without a nuclear agreement, which remains the minimum requirement for any lasting settlement.

Ultimately, the question remains whether Trump can avoid ending up with a deal that looks remarkably similar to the one he spent years condemning.

Originally published in Asharq Al-Awsat article