Will Trump End Up with an Obama-Style Deal?

If we set aside the noise and rhetoric surrounding the negotiations, their continuation is itself a positive indication that both sides are determined to reach some form of agreement. The cost of the current unresolved crisis is high, and any renewed war would be devastating. The Trump administration cannot launch a major war without sufficient support, while the Iranians continue to bleed economically every day as a result of being prevented from fully selling their oil, despite propaganda claiming otherwise. Continued sanctions will eventually force Iran toward one of two options: war or deeper concessions.

But what if it turns out that Donald Trump’s eventual agreement resembles the 2015 deal reached by Barack Obama—an agreement limited solely to the nuclear issue in exchange for lifting sanctions?

In my view, the most likely outcome is indeed a similar agreement, although today’s circumstances differ from those of the past.

Let us step back and revisit what happened during the Obama administration and what drove Tehran to negotiate at that time. The regime of Bashar al-Assad was cornered and weakening under pressure from the Syrian uprising. The Obama administration had declared its intention to punish Assad by imposing a no-fly zone after repeated chemical massacres that shocked global public opinion. Closing the skies over rebel-held areas—which were being bombarded with explosive barrels—would likely have led to the collapse of Tehran’s key ally.

To rescue the situation, Iran waved what resembled the matador’s red cape: its nuclear project. Tehran placed the nuclear file on the negotiating table. Obama judged the nuclear issue to be more important than toppling Assad, and entered negotiations focused on only one issue—the nuclear program—eventually concluding what became known as the comprehensive nuclear agreement.

Historians and politicians remain divided in evaluating that experience. On one hand, the agreement succeeded in reducing uranium enrichment to low levels for a decade, while enriched material was transferred to Russia, effectively depriving Iran at the time of the opportunity to build a nuclear weapon. On the other hand, Iran’s gains were substantial. Assad survived, most sanctions were lifted, billions of dollars in frozen assets were returned, Tehran’s regional proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen were largely ignored, and Iran continued building its ballistic missile arsenal.

Obama succeeded only in delaying the military nuclear project for a relatively short period—one decade. At the time, his administration defended the agreement against criticism from Gulf states, Israel, and the Republican Party, arguing that the deal would build trust with Iran’s regime and encourage reformist tendencies toward peaceful regional and international integration. They also claimed that Iran’s aggressive policies were the result of isolation and fears for regime survival.

In reality, the countries of the region know their neighbor very well, and Obama’s assumptions about changing Tehran’s behavior bore little resemblance to reality.

For years, Trump harshly criticized Obama’s agreement and continues to mock it to this day, repeatedly vowing never to sign a similar deal. Yet because a decisive military outcome has not been achieved, his options remain limited.

Without victory, both sides are ultimately pushed toward negotiation. Both the Trump administration and Tehran’s regime are cornered and in need of some form of agreement. Trump has repeatedly insisted that he is not obligated to accept a “single-issue deal” focused only on the nuclear file—but in the end, he may do exactly that.

At minimum, Trump differs from Obama in that he has tested military force, imposed suffocating sanctions, and achieved certain results. Obama operated under different circumstances: he enjoyed full support from his Democratic Party, backing from European allies, and argued that he had chosen to confront Iran “on the chessboard.”

Trump refuses to sign a near replica of Obama’s agreement because such a move could weaken him politically and electorally, damaging both his public image and historical legacy.

For that reason, we must examine his options and identify the minimum conditions acceptable to “Trump’s camp.” The first concession demanded from Iran concerns the nuclear issue itself: limiting or halting enrichment levels and transferring enriched uranium abroad. Material buried underground remains a central issue for any future agreement.

Second, Iran must abandon any attempt to control the Strait of Hormuz in any form, a necessity for Washington’s Gulf allies.

Third, Israel will insist on remaining exempt from any agreement that restricts its ability to use force against Iran’s regional proxies.

These three expectations represent the minimum conditions required for any agreement to be considered acceptable—and they are remarkably close to the framework of Obama’s 2015 agreement. At that time, the Strait of Hormuz remained open and Israel’s hand remained unrestricted. If a future agreement fails to include such concessions from Iran, then Obama’s deal may ultimately appear the stronger version.

Because both sides are determined to avoid appearing defeated, a new reality may emerge based only on a temporary “disengagement arrangement” at this stage. Recent leaks suggest that United States is prepared gradually to ease restrictions on Iran’s ports in exchange for Iran removing its pressure and mines from the Strait of Hormuz. Iran itself has confirmed a similar narrative, while additionally demanding the release of $24 billion frozen in foreign banks—funds linked to previous oil sales.

Such disengagement would reduce tensions, but it could also prolong negotiations and lessen the pressure created by sanctions. At the same time, the Trump administration cannot fully end the current state of confrontation without at least securing a nuclear agreement—which remains the absolute minimum objective.

Originally published in Asharq Al-Awsat