What Remains of Tehran’s Empire?

Today, Iran is clinging to one objective above all else: preserving whatever remains of its geopolitical gains in the Arab world. The question is whether it can achieve through negotiations what it failed to secure through war.

Tehran seeks to maintain its influence over Iraq and preserve Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon after losing Syria and standing on the verge of losing the Houthis in Yemen. It hopes that negotiations with the U.S. administration will allow it to retain as much of its regional kingdom as possible.

No state has managed to impose such extensive dominance over the Arab region through a combination of hard and soft power as Iran did over the course of three decades—at least until the events of October 7, 2023.

Nasserism spread its ideological and military influence across various parts of the Arab world, but it never succeeded in planting proxies, consolidating governments, and controlling broad geopolitical spheres. Cairo’s authority over Syria under the banner of Arab unity lasted only three years before being swept away by a coup.

Iranian influence, by contrast, was both expansive and enduring, supported by military power on a scale not seen in the region since the decline of British imperial influence.

Tehran had advanced remarkably far in its expansion, extending its reach to Turkey’s borders and the waters of both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

In the current negotiations, Iran is striving to preserve as much of that expansion as possible. Recent developments have revealed the heavy cost of the October 7 operation. With the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Iran no longer possesses a secure corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Its strategic balance vis-à-vis Turkey has weakened, and it has lost two fronts overlooking Israel: southern Lebanon and western Syria.

Tehran’s empire was built through propaganda and arms. It nurtured a generation of Arabs, some of whom embraced the ideals of the Iranian Revolution and its image as a force of resistance against the West and Zionism. Yet for the second time, the old truth expressed by the medieval Arab poet Al-Mutanabbi proved relevant: “The sword is more truthful than books.”

Just as Nasserist expansion once stretched northward into Syria, southward into Yemen, eastward toward Kuwait, and westward into Libya, Israeli military power has now severely damaged its Iranian rival and continues to push it backward across the region.

Expansion was always destined to lead to confrontation with Israel, and the events of October 7 merely accelerated that collision, placing every strategic assumption to the test.

Iran was never a paper tiger. It was a heavily armed military fortress effectively governed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from behind the façade of the clerical establishment. Yet it proved unable to match Israel militarily, especially with the United States standing firmly behind its ally.

Iran’s military resilience exceeded many expectations. However, despite launching thousands of missiles and drones, it failed to achieve significant offensive objectives against Israel.

Its strategists therefore sought to compensate for military shortcomings through a different form of pressure. The possibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz emerged as one of Tehran’s most powerful leverage points.

Yet Hormuz was not the only concern. Iran’s broader pressure campaign against Gulf states effectively turned them into hostages of regional instability. These states have carefully sought to avoid becoming battlefields themselves, accepting certain losses while recognizing that events remain largely beyond their control.

For Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors, allowing the struggle among the major powers to unfold without direct involvement appears preferable to entering the conflict themselves. Whatever the outcome, it is seen as less costly than becoming active participants in the confrontation.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah—the force that once threatened much of the region—is now fighting for survival. Israel, dissatisfied with President Trump’s ceasefire efforts and the negotiation track, opened a front in southern Lebanon, captured Hezbollah strongholds, crossed the Litani River, and now threatens Tyre and perhaps even Beirut itself.

More than one hundred days have passed since the beginning of the war and two months since the ceasefire. During this period, Iran has exhausted much of its strategic leverage.

The sanctions and restrictions imposed by the Trump administration on Iranian ports deprived Tehran of what had become its highest daily source of revenue in four decades.

Observing the course of the conflict and its aftermath suggests that Tehran has little desire to resume large-scale hostilities. Even the limited missile barrage recently launched toward northern Israel appeared more symbolic than substantive, reinforcing the perception that Iran prefers negotiation to renewed confrontation.

The Iranian regime continues to cultivate the image of an unconquerable regional power, hoping to achieve at the negotiating table what it could not secure on the battlefield.

Its willingness to absorb losses, its focus on targeting less defended areas, and its most recent strike against Israel all appeared more theatrical than strategically decisive.

What concerns many observers is the possibility that the United States might fall into what they perceive as an Iranian negotiating trap—granting Tehran significant financial relief, potentially exceeding $24 billion, easing sanctions, and overlooking both its ballistic missile program and its network of regional proxies.

Such concessions, critics argue, would make future confrontations with Iran not less likely, but almost inevitable.