The “Axis of Evil” … and the “Axis of the East”

Dr. Theeb Al-Qaraleh

Orthographically, the difference between the terms “Axis of Evil” and “Axis of the East” is only a single letter. Strategically, geographically, and in terms of capabilities and challenges, however, the gap is vast—reflected in historical calculations, traditional alliances, material and human power, and inevitably in emerging alignments and future consequences.

More than two decades ago, within the framework of its “war on terror,” the United States labeled several countries—namely Iran, North Korea, and Iraq—as part of the “Axis of Evil.” Today, the compass of Western hostility, led by Washington, is shifting toward new “eastern rivals,” to the extent that many Western officials believe they are now facing the most dangerous period since the end of the Cold War. This perception stems from the emergence of what they describe as a “new axis of evil,” referring to Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—suggesting that the coming confrontation will be one between great powers, rather than against extremist organizations (many of which, critics argue, were originally engineered for functional purposes within Western intelligence corridors).

Early on, the American-European media machine began warning of the rising challenge posed by a bloc led by major powers rejecting Western dominance and seeking to reshape the global balance of power. It portrays the growing convergence among Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang—alongside several countries of the Global South—as the nucleus of an “Axis of the East,” or what it labels the “Axis of Authoritarianism,” united by a shared vision advocating a multipolar world order.

In practical terms, no formal or officially declared alliance exists among the countries of this eastern axis. Yet they have significantly intensified economic, military, and diplomatic coordination to weaken Western influence. This coordination reached a peak with a trilateral summit held in Beijing last September, bringing together the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea—an event widely interpreted as signaling the crystallization of this axis. Some American sources even described it as the birth of an “Axis of Disruption,” reflecting Beijing’s growing boldness in challenging Western leadership of the international system, backed by a collective eastern front now asserting itself on the global chessboard.

The contours of this new Cold War—if the term applies—first became evident in the economic arena. The West deployed sanctions to isolate Russia, Iran, and North Korea financially and commercially, while imposing strict restrictions on advanced technology exports to and from China. In response, eastern axis countries sought to circumvent sanctions by expanding intra-bloc trade, sustaining energy flows among allies, and accelerating plans to develop new international trade corridors.

This economic escalation coincided with an intensifying arms race and displays of military power. China, in particular, invested heavily in modernizing its armed forces—especially naval and missile capabilities—to deter any Western intervention in its regional sphere of influence, most notably regarding Taiwan, which Beijing does not rule out reclaiming by force.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine likewise constituted—and continues to represent—a stark challenge to the West. Moscow has repeatedly brandished the nuclear card to deter direct NATO involvement, while the United States and its allies have ramped up military and intelligence support for Ukraine to contain Russia. Yet, despite European pressure, Washington has thus far refrained from supplying Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles that could strike deep inside Russian territory—fearing a dangerous escalation whose consequences would be impossible to predict, especially given Russia’s growing military mobilization and the possibility of overwhelming missile retaliation.

Despite these grave developments, most strategic analysts argue that direct war between the two axes remains unlikely, due to nuclear deterrence and the catastrophic cost of full-scale confrontation. They instead anticipate a prolonged, multi-layered Cold War characterized by economic and technological competition, proxy conflicts, and an accelerating arms race—without tipping into a third world war.

Arab states, for their part, are attempting to distance themselves as much as possible from this emerging polarization by pursuing a carefully calibrated balancing strategy. They have maintained solid security partnerships with Washington while simultaneously expanding economic and technological cooperation with Beijing and Moscow.

The pressing question, however, remains: Will Middle Eastern crises be “cooled down” in the coming months in preparation for a broader Western confrontation with the Axis of the East? And will this rivalry remain confined to a new Cold War framework—or will it slide into a comprehensive military confrontation capable of reshaping the world, its alliances, and the future of coming generations?