Suwayda: Brothers Turned Enemies

Dr. Dhib Al-Qaraleh

Recent developments in Syria’s Suwayda province have revealed a number of critical dimensions, blurred alignments, dormant alliances, and emerging actors that merit careful study and analysis in order to arrive at sound conclusions and meaningful lessons learned.

It is only logical that these phenomena be examined from political, security, social, and economic perspectives, free from preconceived bias in favor of any party and independent of the narratives promoted by the various actors, each driven by its own interests and historical, current, and future agendas.

Given that Syria is composed of a mosaic of ethnicities and sects—including Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and Christians, alongside a Sunni Muslim majority—it is natural to observe divergent interests, orientations, and alliances serving each component.

Within this context, a series of critical questions must be raised—questions that may help transcend blind spots and lead to deeper understanding, enabling attempts to anticipate Syria’s future and that of other unstable states such as Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Lebanon.

First: Are the events in Suwayda a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Druze, or a political confrontation between a societal component and the central state? Or are they the ambitions of a militia concerned solely with expanding its influence, even if that involves seeking support from Israel?

Second: If the situation in Suwayda escalates and clashes resume, will other components—such as the Kurds and Alawites—rise up in solidarity with the Druze on the assumption that collective interest requires it?

Third: What are the long-term objectives of Israeli external intervention under the banner of protecting the Druze, and could this intervention ultimately lead to the internationalization of the crisis?

Fourth: Would similar Israeli intervention—aimed at entrenching a divided rather than unified Syria—occur if relations between Damascus and the Kurdish forces represented by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria deteriorated into armed confrontation?

Fifth: What is the logical explanation for the position of tribal groups in the Suwayda events? Was it driven by localized interests within the province, broader social ties across Syria, or by alignment with the authority in Damascus?

Sixth: Will tribal fighters emerge as a major actor in the Syrian arena following this phase? What will Israel’s position toward them be? Or will they transform into regional militias pursuing their own influence and interests? Alternatively, is this stance merely temporary, fading once the Suwayda crisis subsides?

Seventh: Does this tribal position lay the groundwork for a close alliance with the authorities in Damascus, despite ideological differences—particularly those related to religious or jihadist backgrounds?

Eighth: Might the stance of Syrian tribes inspire similar mobilizations among tribal groups in other unstable states? Could tribal influence and mobilization become transnational in nature?

Ninth: Historically, tribes functioned as effective social institutions in the pre-state era. Will these countries now reposition tribes as political actors and guarantors of stability rather than instruments employed when convenient?

Tenth: Could certain regional and international actors increasingly engage with organized tribal components as reliable partners in contexts where the national state is absent? The U.S. engagement with the Taliban—despite their terrorist designation—offers a telling example of such international pragmatism.

These questions ultimately lead to the central question: Why have we reached this point? What are the root causes, and what forms should solutions take?

The primary cause of the crises afflicting several Arab states, including Syria, lies in the strategic vacuum that emerged after the Arab Spring, bringing with it terrorism, militias, and widespread suffering. This vacuum was fueled by corrupt authoritarian governance, poverty, class inequality, and regional and international interventions driven by political agendas.

Accordingly, these states will not overcome their crises without rebuilding the national state—institutions rather than individuals—reforming political systems, achieving transitional justice through accountability, compensation for victims, and reconciliation mechanisms, and establishing economic justice by fairly distributing wealth and dismantling systems of corruption. Additionally, Arab, regional, and international roles must be reformed through halting support for warring factions, pursuing impartial mediation, and forging a renewed Arab consensus to protect the national state.

The ultimate conclusion is that these crises stem from dysfunctional political systems, compromised elites, and self-serving external interventions. Their resolution requires independent national decision-making, conscious popular will, genuine Arab support free from opportunism, social justice, constitutional protection of all societal components, and an end to reliance on external powers.