Lebanon’s Three Options

On the eve of the launch of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations under full American sponsorship—and one might add, American engineering of both the framework and management of the process—Lebanon stood before three possible scenarios. These emerged within the context of mounting pressure on the ground, marked by both vertical escalation in firepower and horizontal expansion through the widening geographic scope of Israel’s military operations inside Lebanon.

The first possibility was the transformation of the conflict into a prolonged war of attrition that would become the defining feature of military confrontation. Such a conflict could experience periods of escalation and de-escalation, punctuated by fragile ceasefires in various forms and formulas. These truces would remain vulnerable to collapse and renewed fighting, functioning merely as temporary pauses in an ongoing war that could ultimately slide into a broader open conflict.

Under this scenario, Lebanon would effectively become a forgotten cause, except for occasional diplomatic appeals and declarations lacking real influence. One of the greatest dangers lies in the fact that Lebanon’s economic and social conditions are no longer capable of withstanding such a conflict. The result would likely be a cascade of crises affecting every aspect of society and state institutions, pushing Lebanon toward becoming a textbook example of a failed state.

The second possibility involves halting or containing the deterioration through a practical arrangement based on understandings among the regional and international actors competing over Lebanon. Such an arrangement would translate into a political coexistence and a division of influence—either directly among external powers or through their local allies.

This would also place pressure on Israel to accept, at least indirectly, a formula of coexistence or political accommodation among the competing actors, provided that its security concerns were taken into account.

The situation that prevailed after the 2006 war and the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which led to the establishment of the enhanced UNIFIL mission, serves as an example of this model.

While important, such arrangements remain fragile. They can collapse whenever one party decides to overturn them in pursuit of a broader strategic objective. This is precisely what occurred when Hezbollah launched its support front in the context of wider regional calculations that extended beyond Lebanon itself.

Lebanon thus reverted to its traditional role as a stage for the wars of others and a mailbox for regional rivalries. This provided Israel with what many viewed as a strategic opportunity to launch its military campaign against Lebanon within the broader confrontation with Iran, amid dramatic developments across the Levant, including changes in Syria, the war in Gaza and the West Bank, and the increasing strategic significance of the Lebanese arena.

Indeed, whether in the recent past or more distant history, Lebanon has repeatedly served as a battleground for the conflicts of others, regardless of how the actors or the slogans of those conflicts may have changed.

The third scenario was direct negotiations under comprehensive American sponsorship, viewed as the only realistic option despite the numerous challenges surrounding such a process.

At the same time, Lebanon would need to strengthen its contacts with Arab states and friendly countries in order to advance its negotiating objectives.

This scenario falls within the broader context of restoring the role of the Lebanese state, an objective that enjoys broad support across Lebanese society. Yet progress along this path is far from easy. It faces numerous obstacles rooted in the realities and balances of power that have long characterized the conflict with Israel.

One of the most significant challenges is freeing Lebanon from its role as merely a bargaining chip in regional power politics—regardless of the grand slogans under which that role has been justified at different times—and restoring it to its proper place as a sovereign state.

This transition represents a fundamental challenge for rebuilding state authority across all areas of national responsibility.

Among the most important of these responsibilities is engaging in genuine—not merely symbolic—negotiations on issues related to national security in all its dimensions.

The challenges are substantial. First comes the necessity of achieving a complete ceasefire, despite attempts by some parties to promote a gradualist approach. Then come the complexities of dealing effectively with proposed arrangements, securing the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, and reaffirming the authority of the 1949 Armistice Agreement, which was based on Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders.

There is also the need to resolve several remaining disputed border points and establish those boundaries definitively.

The Lebanese approach rests on a gradual, interconnected, and realistic framework. Before discussing peace, it prioritizes ending the Israeli occupation entirely and ensuring that decisions of war and peace are exclusively in the hands of the legitimate Lebanese authorities.

At the same time, Lebanon continues to uphold the Arab Peace Initiative adopted in Beirut in 2002, which calls for a comprehensive, lasting, and just peace. The principles of that initiative, together with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, remain at the core of Lebanon’s negotiating position and help secure broader Arab support.

Ultimately, Lebanon faces what may be described as an existential challenge.

It is no longer possible for the country to remain merely an arena for the wars of others, as though such a role were its destiny.

What Lebanon requires instead is the reconstruction of a state based on institutions—a state capable of embracing all its citizens and strengthening the principles of citizenship and national unity rather than allowing sectarian mini-states and de facto powers to dominate politics, society, the economy, and public life.

That is the role Lebanon needs most urgently, and the role upon which its future ultimately depends.