Freezing the Conflict, Not Resolving It

Even if the United States and Iran announce an agreement in the coming days or weeks on the memorandum of understanding currently under negotiation, it would not mean that the conflict has truly come to an end. Rather, the region would be entering a different phase of confrontation—one defined by the freezing of hostilities rather than the resolution of the underlying dispute.

Political and military indicators that have accumulated since the recent war suggest that neither Washington nor Tel Aviv achieved all the objectives that drove them into the conflict. What has unfolded so far appears less like the conclusion of a war and more like a strategic repositioning ahead of a future round of confrontation. No one knows when that next phase will begin, but all parties seem to be behaving as though it is only a matter of time.

The United States continues to advocate diplomacy while simultaneously signaling that military options remain available should negotiations fail. Israel, for its part, is not acting like a country that has emerged from war having neutralized the Iranian threat. Instead, it appears to be preparing for a more complex phase of confrontation, particularly after acquiring new aerial refueling aircraft that significantly enhance its ability to conduct long-range operations deep inside Iranian territory.

The fundamental challenge for Washington and Tel Aviv is that the recent war may have damaged Iran, but it did not eliminate its ability to maneuver or rebuild its military and security networks. Nor does Tehran appear willing to offer major strategic concessions. Rather, Iranian leaders seem to view any potential agreement as an opportunity to catch their breath and reorganize both the domestic and regional landscape in their favor.

For this reason, any future US-Iran agreement is likely to be limited and temporary. It will probably focus on reducing tensions in the Gulf, managing uranium enrichment activities, safeguarding maritime navigation and energy flows, and providing selective sanctions relief or access to frozen assets. The most sensitive issues—including Iran’s missile program, its regional influence networks, and the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—are likely to remain outside the scope of any comprehensive settlement.

Indeed, the IRGC appears to have emerged from the conflict with an even stronger position within Iran’s power structure. While various Iranian military, security, and civilian institutions have been exposed to significant intelligence penetrations in recent years, the Revolutionary Guard has largely retained its cohesion, resilience, and secrecy.

This may explain why the United States has intensified intelligence efforts aimed at gathering information about the Guard’s leadership and networks. Such efforts suggest that Washington does not regard this issue as settled, fully understood, or strategically acceptable. They also indicate that intelligence penetration of the IRGC may not have reached the level policymakers had hoped for.

These developments are likely to have direct repercussions across the region. If the conflict with Iran enters a period of strategic suspension, Tehran’s spheres of influence will inevitably become new arenas of pressure and attrition. Lebanon is likely to be at the forefront of this dynamic, as Israel recognizes that any future confrontation with Iran cannot be separated from Hezbollah, which remains the actor most directly connected to Israel’s immediate security concerns.

As a result, Israel is expected to focus on preventing Hezbollah from rebuilding its military and logistical capabilities through a combination of limited security operations, political and economic pressure, and efforts to impose new security arrangements in southern Lebanon under the banner of stability and de-escalation.

Iraq, meanwhile, may become the most sensitive arena of all. Washington understands that Iranian influence there is not based solely on political relationships but also on a complex network of armed groups, economic ties, and security linkages.

Consequently, the post-agreement period could witness a gradual shift toward a more assertive American strategy aimed at reducing Tehran’s ability to use Iraq as both a strategic depth and a regional corridor for influence projection.

Iran, however, is unlikely to remain passive. Losing influence in Iraq would effectively mean losing its most important Arab sphere of influence—one that is directly tied to Iranian national security and to the broader network connecting Tehran to Lebanon.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the Middle East is not moving toward comprehensive peace. Instead, it is entering a phase of strategic recalibration, conflict management, and the redesign of confrontation through different instruments. Direct military hostilities may temporarily subside, but the broader struggle will continue through intelligence operations, security pressure, proxy competition, shifting alliances, and the continued use of economic sanctions.

Most importantly, all parties now appear to operate on the assumption that the next confrontation is not a distant possibility but merely a postponed phase. Preparations are quietly underway as each side waits for the moment when it believes it is better positioned to achieve what the last war failed to deliver.