Barak — Will He Push Hezbollah into a Clash?

Dr. Dhib Al-Qaraleh

Lebanon’s crisis appears to be gradually moving, day by day, toward increasingly dangerous trajectories, given the divergence of agendas, intentions, and interests among the various actors involved. This is occurring amid mounting international and regional pressure on Beirut, where financial assistance and support have been explicitly linked to the disarmament of Hezbollah—a demand the group has categorically rejected, believing that its strength and future role depend solely on its weapons rather than on any promises or guarantees from external parties.

The ambiguous statements made by U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, during his three visits to Lebanon—both announced and surprise—suggest that something ominous is being quietly prepared, to be activated at a time deemed suitable by Israel and the United States.

Barrack stated that Lebanon’s very existence is at stake, while simultaneously asserting that Hezbollah’s disarmament is strictly a domestic matter and that failure to hand over weapons would be disappointing but would not carry consequences from Washington. Yet during the same period, Barrack reportedly delivered two documents to Lebanese officials demanding the complete disarmament of Hezbollah—particularly its heavy weaponry, including missiles and drones—which Israel considers threatening. He further stressed that this process must be completed within a fixed timeline ending before the close of the current year.

In other remarks, Barrack emphasized that the United States would not compel Israel to take any action, while also claiming there would be no Israeli war against Lebanon. This raises a critical question: What plan is this envoy actually pursuing? His mixed messages come at a time when he is fully aware of the precarious position of the Lebanese government, which fears that attempting to forcibly disarm Hezbollah through the army—if even possible—could ignite a civil war, potentially drawing in international intervention, especially if its consequences spill across borders. Is such a scenario precisely what is being engineered?

These contradictory signals have been mirrored by Hezbollah’s repeated declarations that it will not surrender its weapons. This prompts the question: Has Barrack successfully maneuvered Hezbollah into a trap—convincing it that there would be no American or Israeli repercussions for retaining its arms—thereby encouraging the group to openly harden its stance? Has Hezbollah swallowed the bait by reaffirming, through its secretary-general, that disarmament is impossible as long as Israel continues to occupy contested Lebanese hills and violates the agreement signed on November 27 of last year?

Further evidence of premeditated intentions can be seen in Israel’s push for Washington to terminate the mission of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Notably, the U.S. Congress has not renewed funding allocations for the upcoming UNIFIL budget cycle, despite the fact that Washington covers nearly one-third of the force’s expenses.

The Lebanese state now finds itself in a condition of profound anxiety and political paralysis—caught between the rigidity of Hezbollah’s position and the fear of civil war on one side, and intense American and international pressure on the other.

Although Beirut has sought U.S. guarantees for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanese territory and assurances against future attacks, Washington’s responses have been deeply disappointing, effectively leaving Israel with a free hand to act as it sees fit.

If the official Lebanese stance is strained and complex, Hezbollah’s supporters also voice growing fears that Israel may not stop at disarming the group but could move toward displacing Shiite populations from southern Lebanon. They further warn of additional threats emerging from jihadist forces in Syria.

Conversely, many Lebanese factions opposed to Hezbollah view the group’s refusal to disarm as an Iranian decision, rooted in Tehran’s fear of being targeted again. From this perspective, Iran seeks to preserve its regional proxies as functional pressure tools and deterrence instruments.

While Israel and the United States focus primarily on stripping Hezbollah of its heavy weapons, large segments of Lebanese society consider the group’s light arms to be even more dangerous, believing they could be turned inward against fellow Lebanese in any future confrontation.

Given these deep divisions and conflicting agendas, Lebanon will continue to sit on a bed of hot coals, its conditions ripe for multiple scenarios—each closely tied to the sudden and volatile developments across the region. The broader regional trajectory appears to be moving toward widespread disarmament as a defining feature of the emerging Middle East order—one in which the only dominant and effective military power remains Israel.