Azerbaijanis in Iran: Between Integration into the State and the Rise of Cross-Border Identities

At first glance, the Azerbaijani issue may appear to be little more than a matter concerning a large ethnic minority within Iran. A closer examination, however, reveals that it is one of the most consequential questions shaping the future of the Islamic Republic’s domestic cohesion and regional posture. The Azerbaijanis are neither a marginal community nor a peripheral group living on the fringes of the state. Rather, they constitute one of the foundational components of modern Iran, occupying prominent positions within the political establishment, the economy, the military, and the religious hierarchy. Yet the rise of Azerbaijani nationalism in the South Caucasus, the expansion of Turkish influence, and Israel’s growing presence along Iran’s northern frontier have collectively revived longstanding concerns in Tehran that Azerbaijani identity could evolve into a geopolitical lever against the Iranian state.

Azerbaijanis at the Core of the State, Not Its Margins

Unlike several other ethnic groups in Iran—such as the Kurds, Baloch, or Arabs of Khuzestan—the Azerbaijanis occupy a fundamentally different position within Iran’s political and social structure. Since the Safavid era in the sixteenth century, Turkic Azerbaijani tribes have played a central role in the construction of the Iranian state itself.

Many historians argue that the Safavid Empire, which laid the foundations of modern Iran and established Twelver Shiism as the state religion, was built upon military alliances dominated by the Qizilbash Turkic tribes, for whom Azerbaijani Turkish served as a principal language. Consequently, many Iranian Azerbaijanis do not view themselves as outsiders or a distinct community separated from Iranian identity; rather, they see themselves as historical partners in shaping it.

The ascent of Azerbaijani figures to the highest levels of power reflects this reality. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, for instance, comes from an Azerbaijani family and speaks Azerbaijani Turkish fluently. Numerous senior figures within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the clerical establishment, and the state bureaucracy also trace their origins to Azerbaijani regions.

Yet political integration has not eliminated growing concerns among segments of the Azerbaijani population that the Iranian state continues to promote a centralized Persian cultural model that marginalizes non-Persian languages and identities.

Iran’s Dilemma: Shiism Unites, Nationalism Divides

One of the Islamic Republic’s most complex challenges lies in the fact that the very factor that strengthens domestic cohesion—Shiite identity—is not necessarily the primary determinant of ethnic and national loyalties.

Although Iranian Azerbaijanis and the citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan share a predominantly Twelver Shiite heritage, modern Azerbaijani nationalism has increasingly come to revolve around language, history, and ethnic identity rather than religion.

Tehran fears that this shift may gradually weaken the capacity of Shiite solidarity to contain cross-border nationalist sentiments.

This concern is amplified by an important demographic reality that is often overlooked: there are likely more Azerbaijanis living in Iran than in the Republic of Azerbaijan itself. While Azerbaijan’s population stands at roughly ten million, most estimates place the number of Iranian Azerbaijanis between fifteen and twenty-five million.

As a result, any significant rise in Azerbaijani nationalism could potentially have a greater impact inside Iran than within the Azerbaijani state itself.

The South Caucasus: From Buffer Zone to Strategic Challenge

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 fundamentally transformed Iran’s strategic environment. Instead of sharing a long border with a single superpower, Tehran suddenly found itself neighboring several newly independent states, most notably Azerbaijan.

Initially, Iranian leaders believed that shared Shiite identity would naturally draw Baku closer to Tehran. The opposite occurred.

Independent Azerbaijan adopted a secular political model more closely aligned with Turkey than with Iran and steadily expanded its strategic relations with both the United States and Israel.

Over time, Israel emerged as one of Azerbaijan’s most important defense partners. Various estimates suggest that during certain periods, between 60 and 70 percent of Azerbaijan’s military imports originated from Israel.

From Tehran’s perspective, the issue therefore extends far beyond relations with a neighboring state. It involves the emergence of what Iranian policymakers regard as a hostile strategic presence along one of the country’s most sensitive frontiers.

The Karabakh War and the Transformation of Regional Power Dynamics

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 represented a watershed moment in Iran’s strategic calculations.

For nearly three decades, the status quo in the region provided Tehran with a degree of balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s military victory, backed by substantial Turkish and Israeli support, fundamentally altered that equation.

For the first time since the Soviet collapse, a Turkish-Azerbaijani axis emerged with the capacity to reshape the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus.

Iranian policymakers understood that Baku’s victory carried significance far beyond military gains. It also possessed profound symbolic and psychological implications for millions of Azerbaijanis inside Iran, many of whom viewed the conflict as a matter of national and ethnic solidarity.

Consequently, Azerbaijani-majority cities across Iran witnessed demonstrations in support of Azerbaijan during the war, exposing a level of popular identification with Baku rarely seen in previous decades.

The Zangezur Corridor: Iran’s Geopolitical Nightmare

Few issues generate greater concern in Tehran today than the proposed Zangezur Corridor.

The project seeks to establish a transport route through Armenian territory linking mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan and, ultimately, Turkey.

On the surface, the initiative appears to be a transportation and trade project. Iran, however, sees it as a strategic undertaking capable of reshaping the region’s geopolitical architecture.

If realized, the corridor could diminish Iran’s importance as a transit route connecting the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and Turkey. More importantly, it would create a direct land connection linking the broader Turkic world from Anatolia to Central Asia.

This explains why Iranian officials have repeatedly opposed any alteration of internationally recognized borders in the South Caucasus and have conducted large-scale military exercises near Azerbaijan’s borders in recent years.

Turkey and the Revival of the Pan-Turkic Vision

Tehran understands that the broader challenge extends beyond Azerbaijan itself. It is increasingly concerned about Turkey’s wider political and cultural project centered on the concept of the “Turkic World.”

Through institutions such as the Organization of Turkic States, Ankara has sought to strengthen linguistic, cultural, economic, and political ties among Turkic peoples stretching from the Balkans to Central Asia.

Although this project does not officially advocate territorial claims within Iran, its growing influence reinforces a sense of transnational identity among some Iranian Azerbaijanis.

This dynamic helps explain Tehran’s sharp reaction to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reciting verses from the “Aras” poem during Azerbaijan’s victory celebrations in 2020. Iranian officials interpreted the reference to the Aras River—which historically divided Azerbaijani populations—as a symbolic invocation of Azerbaijani unity across existing borders.

Does Iran Face a Genuine Secessionist Threat?

At present, the most realistic answer is no.

Azerbaijani separatist movements within Iran remain limited in both organizational capacity and popular support. They lack the political infrastructure necessary to transform their aspirations into a mass movement capable of threatening Iran’s territorial integrity.

Furthermore, Azerbaijanis are far more deeply integrated into Iran’s political and economic structures than many other ethnic minorities.

Yet the scenario that concerns Tehran is not immediate secession. Rather, it is the possibility that Azerbaijani-populated regions could become increasingly vulnerable to external influence during periods of domestic instability.

Should a severe economic crisis coincide with elite political fragmentation, rising Turkish nationalism, and expanding Israeli influence in Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani question could evolve from a cultural issue into one of the most significant strategic challenges facing the Iranian state.

Conclusion

The Azerbaijani issue is not merely a minority rights question within Iran. It sits at the intersection of three overlapping arenas of competition: the struggle over identity within the Iranian state, the contest for influence in the South Caucasus, and the broader regional rivalry involving Iran, Turkey, and Israel.

For this reason, Tehran regards the Azerbaijani population as an indispensable component of the Iranian nation while simultaneously treating any political or cultural mobilization that transcends state borders as a matter directly linked to national security. Between these two realities lies one of the most sensitive and strategically consequential issues shaping Iran’s domestic stability and regional future.