Ankara and Israel’s “War Obsession”

Could a war break out between Israel and Turkey?

This question has been repeatedly raised for more than a year, particularly since the publication in January 2025 of a report by Israel’s so-called Nagel Committee, which emphasized the importance of preparing for a potential war with Turkey.

Less than four months later, the Turkish National Intelligence Academy issued a report of its own. Drawing lessons from the twelve-day confrontation involving the United States and Israel against Iran, it recommended the construction of deep shelters in all major Turkish cities “to protect civilians and implement advanced cyber measures to safeguard the information infrastructure of state institutions.” The report noted that modern wars have become multidimensional, involving every type of weapon and making intensive use of technology and unconventional methods of warfare.

The Turkish report did not explicitly mention a confrontation with Israel. Nevertheless, many Turkish military analysts linked the academy’s recommendations to the possibility of future military tensions with Israel, particularly given the growing emphasis in Israeli media on what is increasingly described as a “Turkish threat” that requires preemptive preparation.

This narrative has been reinforced by official Israeli statements. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has accused Turkey of supporting what he described as a terrorist regime in Iran, while former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett referred to Turkey earlier this year as “the new Iran.”

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan responded by arguing that Israel cannot survive politically without creating enemies and that it is now attempting to cast Turkey in that role for domestic purposes.

Such remarks suggest that Ankara fully understands the predicament facing Israel’s political establishment, whether within the ruling Likud coalition and its far-right and ultra-Orthodox partners or among the center-right opposition. Across the political spectrum, there is an ongoing debate about the costs and benefits of Israel’s various military engagements—from Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria to operations conducted in coordination with Washington.

At its core, this debate concerns Israel’s military doctrine and the transformations that different factions believe are necessary to prevent a future existential threat to the state. It also reflects the perceived need to maintain a permanent external danger capable of rallying public opinion and generating social cohesion behind military action, consistent with Israel’s longstanding doctrine of preventive warfare.

The exchange of rhetoric in Turkish and Israeli media reveals a simultaneous tendency toward military preparedness and recognition of significant constraints that limit either side’s ability to initiate direct hostilities.

These constraints stem from both geographical realities and broader strategic considerations that shape each country’s security doctrine.

In one televised intervention, a retired Turkish general outlined a hypothetical military scenario in which Turkey, responding to an Israeli strike, would launch approximately 1,200 drones—both loitering munitions and long-range precision systems—alongside roughly 400 ballistic missiles capable of covering Israel’s entire territory.

His question was simple: could Israel effectively absorb the losses resulting from such an attack?

The implicit message centered on deterrence and mutual vulnerability. Rather than advocating war, the scenario underscored the potentially devastating costs of direct confrontation and suggested that alternative pathways are preferable.

The broader question, however, remains whether international circumstances would permit such a conflict in the first place.

From the Israeli perspective, the issue appears less about preparing for an imminent military confrontation and more about constructing the image of a potential enemy around which society can unite behind strong leadership.

This dynamic is particularly visible in the behavior of Israel’s governing coalition. Societies shaped by fear and uncertainty often seek collectively constructed threats that generate a fragile sense of cohesion. Rational calculation becomes secondary to collective psychological mobilization.

Turkey fits many of the characteristics of the ideal external adversary from an Israeli domestic political perspective. It is the strongest competitor to Israeli ambitions in post-Assad Syria. It has successfully developed a domestic defense industry that has proven its effectiveness in multiple theaters. It adheres, at least implicitly, to the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, emphasizing maritime influence in both the Mediterranean and Red Seas. It also enjoys increasingly sophisticated political and military relationships with major regional actors, particularly Egypt and key Gulf states.

As such, Turkey can serve as a useful image of a future threat around which Israeli public opinion may rally.

Yet the external reality presents a much more complicated picture.

Turkey possesses strategic depth, geographic scale, and demographic resources that are incomparable to Israel’s. It is also a member of NATO. Regardless of Israeli attempts to portray Ankara as a troublesome ally within the alliance, Turkey remains a cornerstone of NATO’s southern flank and is not a partner that the alliance can easily abandon.

Likewise, a direct military confrontation with Turkey would carry immense risks.

Moreover, Ankara maintains substantial relations with successive American administrations. Although disagreements periodically emerge over specific policy issues, the broader strategic framework binding Turkey and the United States remains intact.

Turkey also continues to enjoy significant influence across much of the Islamic world, a reality unlikely to be altered by Israeli public diplomacy campaigns, including those conducted within the United States itself.

The central dilemma is that many of the reports, analyses, and media narratives circulating in both countries create impressions that are far removed from political reality.

There will undoubtedly continue to be a harsh confrontation in the realm of rhetoric and strategic messaging. But the constraints imposed by geography, alliance structures, military balances, and international politics remain far stronger than the momentum pushing toward a direct military conflict.

In the final analysis, while Ankara and Tel Aviv may continue to view each other with growing suspicion, the realities of power politics suggest that a propaganda war is far more likely than an actual one.