A Hybrid War on Iran, With the Region’s Flanks in Sight

Dr. Dhib Al-Qaraleh

Strategic indicators at both the regional and international levels continue to suggest that the Middle East will not achieve stability until all unresolved files and contentious issues are fully “reengineered” in line with the objectives, aspirations, and plans of the dominant global powers—led by the United States and its protégé, Israel.

With the end of the reciprocal strikes in the “first round” of the Israeli–Iranian war, policymakers and strategic planners—both civilian and military—in Washington and Tel Aviv have entered a phase of intensive brainstorming to map out the form, timing, and battlefield of the “second phase” of confrontation with Tehran. This next stage is expected to take the form of a prolonged hybrid war waged largely by proxy, particularly since the twelve-day conflict failed to fully achieve both declared and undeclared objectives.

It is not unlikely that events will repeat themselves within weeks. The first round of the war erupted while the world was awaiting the sixth round of U.S.–Iran negotiations in Muscat, and the second phase may also unfold amid renewed talk of possible negotiations. The critical question is whether Tehran will be bitten twice from the same hole.

During the first round, the confidential report of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the resolution of its Board of Governors regarding Iran’s lack of cooperation served as a Trojan horse used by Israel to justify its attack on Iran. The question now is whether Iran’s threats against the Agency’s Director General, Rafael Grossi, and its refusal to make concessions on its nuclear and missile programs will become the new track upon which the second phase of war proceeds—this time through direct Israeli-American coordination and overt European backing.

In the coming days, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected in Washington, preceded by his Minister for Strategic Affairs, alongside reports of a $510 million U.S. weapons sale to Israel. The official agenda focuses on “ending the Gaza file,” but the deeper, unspoken objective concerns planning the second phase of the war against Iran.

This next phase is anticipated to achieve its initial breakthroughs not in Tehran’s central power structures but in Iran’s peripheral regions and border areas—those with non-Persian majorities. While the central state would be militarily exhausted and forced to consolidate its hard power around the capital, control over the periphery would weaken, creating opportunities for fragmentation.

Accordingly, Washington meetings are expected to explore two parallel tracks: direct military action against new Iranian targets using different tactics, and a synchronized internal destabilization strategy. This latter plan would seek to activate Kurdish opposition groups, the Arabistan Liberation Front, the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, monarchists, secular republican movements, and others—effectively beginning to “gnaw away” at Iran from the edges.

Mobilizing Iran’s already simmering public anger against the regime is also considered a viable option from U.S. and Israeli perspectives. This could begin with women- and youth-led protests over repression and injustice, generating international sympathy for a prospective uprising—especially in light of the harsh crackdowns such movements would likely face.

Tehran—long adept at buying time in pursuit of nuclear capability through what it terms political dissimulation and strategic patience—fully understands that war is approaching. Yet its room for maneuver is extremely limited in the absence of reliable allies.

Consequently, Iranian threats and claims of victimhood are likely to remain confined to its own media platforms, finding little resonance in global public opinion. Even credible narratives are unlikely to gain traction.

Europe’s post-war stance remains firmly aligned with Washington, with leading EU powers—Britain, France, and Germany—renewing threats to reimpose sanctions should Iran fail to comply with international demands.

On the ground, the balance of power has shifted markedly against Tehran. Iran suffered strategic blows in the first round of war, particularly through intelligence penetration. It has lost its foothold in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime, severing the geographic corridor from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. Hezbollah’s capabilities in Lebanon have been significantly constrained, Iraqi allied factions remain in enforced dormancy despite rhetorical threats, and the future effectiveness of the Houthis remains uncertain.

In light of Israel’s uncompromising hostility, Washington’s full alignment, Europe’s support of the American axis, and the unwillingness of Moscow and Beijing to sacrifice for Tehran, Iran’s strategic options appear increasingly narrow.

The pressing question is whether Iran—if war is imposed—will resort to a reverse “Samson Option” by unleashing thousands of lethal missiles toward Israel in the next confrontation.

Despite escalating rhetoric and mutual threats, a last-minute U.S.–Iranian agreement cannot be ruled out—though it would almost certainly come on humiliating terms for Tehran. Iran may seek only a face-saving exit to avoid two equally bitter outcomes: a devastating Israeli-American-European military campaign that cripples its economy and strategic infrastructure, or an even harsher sanctions regime that further exhausts its fragile economy and destabilizes its already restless domestic front.

Until either war or a fragile settlement materializes, Iranian talk of “surprises” and American-Israeli insistence on eliminating the Iranian threat will dominate headlines as part of a psychological warfare and media pressure campaign. Meanwhile, real negotiations and serious deals are likely to occur behind closed doors—far from public view, where populations often see only fragments of the truth.

For Arab states, strategic interest dictates that neither side emerge victorious, so that mutual deterrence remains intact—ultimately serving Arab national security. Accordingly, official Arab positions will likely remain cautious, neutral, and hesitant, as in the first round of war, while popular reactions will continue to be fragmented and often driven by emotional rather than strategic considerations.

Although most Arabs believe Iran’s nuclear program must remain peaceful—since they would likely be its first victims if weaponized—they are deeply frustrated by global hypocrisy that ignores Israel’s nuclear arsenal while aggressively policing Iran. This sense of injustice is further compounded by the world’s inaction on Arab and Islamic causes, most starkly demonstrated by the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza.

Globally, negative neutrality will continue to dominate, with most states distancing themselves from the conflict and limiting their involvement to symbolic mediation efforts or logistical facilitation of potential U.S.–Iran agreements.