A Dangerous Visit — and Provocative Developments

Dr. Dhib Al-Qaraleh

In light of the outcomes of Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz’s current visit to Washington and the files under discussion, a pressing question arises: Will the region stretching from Gaza to Iran—passing through Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq—witness major new developments and dangerous escalations in the coming period, some of which may be unexpected, with inevitable political, economic, security, and humanitarian repercussions across parts of the Middle East?

This is a legitimate question. What is unfolding on both the regional and international stages suggests that such developments are not coincidental or reactive but rather the implementation of pre-designed scenarios and contingency plans. Broad strategic decisions and orientations appear to have already been agreed upon during Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent visit to Washington, while military, security, and timing details are now being refined.

From a strictly logical perspective, some may doubt that events will unfold with such speed, sequence, and through the same tools and actors. Yet history often shows that those who rely solely on rational expectations are the ones who lose. It is therefore necessary to think in reverse—to anticipate the opponent’s mindset and methods rather than our own logical assumptions.

What stands out in the Israeli defense minister’s visit—often described as an echo of Netanyahu’s voice—is the reported signing of a secret memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tel Aviv. This raises serious questions about its contents, what it conceals beyond existing public cooperation, and whether its secrecy stems from potential negative repercussions for some of Washington’s regional allies.

Preparations for upcoming developments have already begun on the political and media fronts. In Lebanon, narratives have intensified over recent days regarding continued Iranian arms smuggling to Hezbollah and the group’s growing domestic missile and drone production capabilities. Hezbollah itself has provided Israel and the United States with pretexts by reaffirming that it will not disarm—simultaneously antagonizing domestic and international audiences.

This rhetoric has coincided with reports of a vessel smuggling Iranian weapons to the Houthis—who have recently escalated threats to international shipping—and with mysterious drone attacks on oil fields operated by American and Western companies in northern Iraq. Together, these developments place Hezbollah’s southern suburbs in Beirut, Sana’a, and Iran-backed Iraqi militias within a single targeting framework.

The next round of military action against these three fronts is likely to precede—or coincide with—direct pressure on Iran itself, unless Tehran swiftly submits and returns to negotiations, depriving it of time to rebuild its balance of power. In this context, it is unsurprising that the European Union has given Iran a vague deadline—until summer—to resume talks or face consequences.

Developments in Syria will not be detached from this broader regional design. Despite the ceasefire arrangements backed by the United States and supported by Jordan, Arab states, and Turkey, southern Syria is expected to be demilitarized, while Suwayda will remain a persistent pressure point. Meanwhile, former and current jihadist fighters—Arab and foreign alike—will continue to serve as strategic reserves, potentially deployed against Hezbollah and Iraqi militias if necessary. This dynamic was reinforced by recent statements from Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem, who classified these groups as enemies alongside Israel.

Timeframes now appear tailored to strategic plans. The sixty-day ceasefire proposal in Gaza does not signal an Israeli intention to end the war or pursue peace. On the contrary, Israeli intelligence services are reportedly planning population displacement campaigns, working with the United States to persuade Ethiopia, Libya, and Indonesia to absorb hundreds of thousands of Gazans—part of a broader vision linked to the construction of a tent city on the ruins of Rafah. These efforts coincided with renewed U.S. presidential remarks about the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, reviving tensions between Cairo and Addis Ababa.

President Trump—who had previously granted Iran sixty days before launching strikes—seems to have embraced the ultimatum approach, now giving Moscow fifty days to end the Ukraine war or face sweeping tariffs and sanctions. Israel, in turn, granted Damascus forty-eight hours to intervene in Suwayda to halt clashes there.

This raises a critical question: Who will receive the next deadline?

Will it be Turkey—pressured to relinquish its influential role in Syria in exchange for a share of post-war reconstruction projects largely dominated by American firms in the oil, gas, and energy sectors?

Will it be Iraq—forced to sever ties with Iran and dismantle Tehran’s influence?

Or will other allied states face similar ultimatums at different moments whenever their policies clash with Israel’s broader ambitions and strategic objectives?