Will Trump End Up with an Obama-Style Deal?

If we set aside the noise and competing narratives surrounding the negotiations, their continuation is, in itself, a positive sign that both sides are determined to reach an agreement. The cost of maintaining the current state of crisis is high, while a renewed war would be devastating. The Trump administration lacks the political support necessary to launch a major military campaign, while Iran continues to suffer economically from restrictions on its oil exports despite official claims to the contrary. Prolonged sanctions will eventually force Tehran toward one of two options: escalation or greater concessions.

But what if Trump ultimately reaches an agreement resembling the 2015 Obama deal—one focused solely on the nuclear issue in exchange for sanctions relief?

In my view, that remains the most likely outcome, although today's circumstances differ significantly from those of a decade ago.

To understand the current situation, it is worth revisiting the context in which the Obama administration negotiated with Iran. At the time, Bashar al-Assad's regime was under severe pressure and appeared increasingly vulnerable as the Syrian uprising gained momentum. The Obama administration had signaled its intention to punish Assad by imposing a no-fly zone following repeated chemical attacks that shocked international public opinion. Restricting Syrian air operations over opposition-held areas would likely have accelerated the collapse of one of Tehran's most important regional allies.

In response, Iran effectively played what might be called its "red card": its nuclear program. Tehran placed the issue on the negotiating table, and Obama concluded that preventing a nuclear crisis was more important than pursuing Assad's downfall. As a result, negotiations focused almost exclusively on the nuclear file, culminating in what became known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Historians and policymakers remain divided over the legacy of that agreement. On one hand, it successfully reduced uranium enrichment levels for roughly a decade and transferred enriched material to Russia, effectively denying Tehran a near-term pathway to a nuclear weapon. On the other hand, Iran secured substantial gains. Assad survived, most sanctions were lifted, billions of dollars in frozen assets were released, regional proxy activities in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen continued largely unchecked, and Tehran maintained the development of its ballistic missile capabilities.

Obama succeeded in postponing Iran's potential military nuclear ambitions—but only temporarily. His administration defended the agreement against criticism from Gulf states, Israel, and Republicans, arguing that engagement would build trust with Tehran and encourage reformist tendencies within the Iranian system. According to this view, Iran's aggressive regional behavior stemmed largely from isolation and insecurity. Yet many countries in the region, long familiar with their neighbor's strategic outlook, viewed such assumptions as detached from reality.

For years, Donald Trump has criticized the Obama agreement and continues to mock it, repeatedly pledging never to accept a similar arrangement. However, because military action has not produced a decisive outcome, his options remain constrained.

Without a clear victory, both sides are pushed back toward diplomacy. The Trump administration and the Iranian leadership alike find themselves under pressure and in need of some form of agreement. Trump has repeatedly insisted that he is not obligated to accept a single-issue nuclear deal, yet circumstances may ultimately lead him in that direction.

At least one important distinction separates Trump from Obama: Trump has demonstrated a willingness to employ military force and has imposed a far more severe sanctions regime, producing tangible pressure on Tehran. Obama operated under different conditions, benefiting from strong Democratic Party support and broad European backing while pursuing a strategy centered on diplomacy.

Trump is reluctant to sign what could be perceived as a replica of Obama's agreement because doing so could weaken his standing among Republicans, damage his political image, and undermine the historical legacy he seeks to build.

Therefore, it is important to consider the minimum conditions that the Trump camp would likely require. The first and most essential nuclear concession would involve limiting enrichment levels and transferring enriched uranium abroad, particularly material stored in underground facilities.

Second, any reduction in Iran's ability to threaten or control the Strait of Hormuz would be vital for Washington's Gulf allies.

Third, Israel would likely insist on retaining freedom of action against Iran's regional proxy networks, regardless of any broader agreement.

These three elements constitute the minimum requirements for any deal to be considered acceptable. Interestingly, they are not far removed from the realities that prevailed under the 2015 agreement. At that time, the Strait of Hormuz remained open, and Israel retained significant operational freedom. If a future agreement fails to secure comparable concessions from Tehran, some may conclude that Obama's deal was, in fact, the stronger arrangement.

Because neither side wishes to appear defeated, the more immediate outcome may be a limited de-escalation framework rather than a comprehensive settlement. Recent reports suggest that Washington could gradually ease restrictions on Iranian ports in exchange for Tehran removing threats and mines from the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials have echoed similar proposals while insisting on access to approximately $24 billion in frozen funds held abroad from previous oil sales.

Such a de-escalation arrangement could reduce tensions, but it may also prolong negotiations by easing the economic pressure that sanctions currently exert on Iran. At the same time, the Trump administration is unlikely to bring the current state of confrontation to a close without securing at least a minimum nuclear agreement.

Originally published in Asharq Al-Awsat.