Is There Light at the End of the Tunnel?

Despite Trump’s threats to destroy Iran and eliminate its very existence, his statements that the country is in a dire situation and is begging for an end to the war, and his subsequent assertion that the war will end after next month’s midterm elections, one thing remains certain: like every war, this conflict will eventually come to an end. It may conclude as a result of mounting economic and military pressures, or it may escalate into an even more dangerous and extreme confrontation.

The failure of the United States to overthrow the Iranian regime, despite sustained Israeli pressure, lends weight to the prospect of a negotiated settlement. Washington has long been reluctant to return to the model of forcibly overthrowing existing regimes and installing alternative political elites, following its resounding failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has therefore either refrained from pursuing this option or proved unable to implement it, recognizing from these previous experiences the scale of the risks that could engulf the region—including terrorism, chaos, and widespread destruction—if it attempted to repeat the same approach in Iran.

The collapse of the U.S.-Iranian memorandum of understanding has effectively brought the situation back to square one. The United States subsequently resumed its attacks on Iran, while the Houthis escalated their military operations in Yemen and against Saudi Arabia, leaving the entire region exposed to grave risks.

A successful ceasefire agreement involving the United States and Israel would, in practical terms, signify Washington’s abandonment of its project of overthrowing existing regimes through military force. Such a shift would be highly consequential and would also mean, almost by default, that Iran’s current governing system would remain in place, albeit in a modified form.

The same governing establishment in Tehran that has fought the United States would be responsible for signing any new agreement. It would not be replaced by a political elite imposed by Washington from abroad, as occurred in previous failed experiments. This would mean that no new regime would emerge declaring its intention to eradicate the previous one, because Iran’s current regime would itself be the incumbent system. Nor would there be armed factions declaring war on a new, U.S.-imposed government, as the Taliban did in Afghanistan before ultimately overthrowing the U.S.-backed political order. Instead, Iran’s existing governing establishment would remain in place, albeit in a new and potentially more reformed form.

If the light at the end of the tunnel proves real, Iran would benefit from avoiding the violent overthrow of its current regime and the resulting descent into chaos. Nevertheless, the regime that survives would face significant demands: it would need to undertake far-reaching reforms, address the country’s mounting economic problems, and explain to its people why it agreed to end the war only after such a prolonged delay, when an earlier agreement might have preserved the country’s economic and military resources.

If, however, the light turns out to be an illusion and the war erupts once again, Iran could become a wounded lion, striking out at everyone—from the Gulf states to many other countries across the region. The dangers of retaliation, violence, and terrorism would then threaten all parties, particularly now that the Houthis have emerged as participants in the war as part of Iran’s broader strategic framework.